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Adjudicative competence, more commonly referred to as competence to stand trial, is a highly 
undertheorized area of law.  Though it is well established that, to be competent, a criminal 
defendant must have a “rational” as well as “factual” understanding of her situation, the 
meaning of such “rational understanding” has gone largely undefined.  Given the large number 
of criminal prosecutions in which competence is at issue, the doctrine’s instability stands in stark 
contrast to its importance. 
This Article argues that adjudicative competence, properly understood, asks whether a criminal 
defendant has capacity to participate meaningfully in the host of decisions potentially required 
of her.  Further, sound assessment of such capacity requires attention to both the cognitive and 
emotional influences on rational decision-making in situations of personal relevance and risk.  
The role of emotion has been neglected, both in traditional accounts of decision-making and in 
assessments of adjudicative competence, and merits particular attention. This Article explores
two examples of potentially competence-threatening emotional dysfunction—severe psychiatric 
mood disorder and organic brain damage—either of which may interfere unreasonably with 
decision-relevant emotional perception, processing, and expression.  Existing legal theory and 
forensic testing methods, which reflect a predominantly cognitive approach, do not account 
adequately for such dysfunction.  Shifting the adjudicative competence inquiry away from a 
general search for “rationality” and toward a more finely-grained examination of the cognitive 
and emotional influences on rational decision-making processes offers our best hope for giving 
meaning to “rational understanding.”
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Introduction
[C]ognition is not as logical as it was once thought and 
emotions are not always so illogical.1
The legal standard for adjudicative competence2 appears simple: as the Supreme Court 
declared in Dusky v. United States, the test is whether a criminal defendant “has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”3
This surface clarity, however, disguises a fundamental lack of transparent meaning.  A robust 
conception of adjudicative competence that gives meaning to the Dusky standard must ask 
whether a criminal defendant has the capacity to participate meaningfully in the host of decisions 
potentially required of her, and sound assessment of such capacity requires careful attention to 
both the cognitive and emotional influences on rational decision-making.  To date, no such 
theory of Dusky rationality has been adequately articulated, and implementation of the 
adjudicative competence construct is commensurately unstable.  A decision-making approach, 
one that overtly concerns itself with both emotion and cognition, offers a path to both legitimate 
and stabilize a confused area of criminal law.
Adjudicative competence is, in many respects, the neglected younger sibling of the 
insanity defense, a secondary status that may explain its instability and relatively low profile.  Its 
jurisprudence has grown up in insanity’s shadow, to the extent that until quite recently it was 
referred to as “present insanity.”4  Indeed, in the execution context the language of insanity and 
1 JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 35 (1996).
2 See NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 40 (2002) 
(“adjudicative competence” is a “more appropriate term than ‘competence to stand trial,’ given that approximately 
90 percent of all criminal cases in the United States are resolved by means of guilty pleas, rather than at trial”).  
3 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
4 See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 357-59 & nn.8-14 (1996); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 397, 405-06 
(1993).  The intertwining of insanity and competence has its origins in Blackstone and Hale, who conceived 
incompetence as a form of “madness” likely distinguished from legal insanity only by reason of afflicting a 
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competence continues to be confusingly intertwined.5 Forensic experts often undertake to 
examine both competence and legal insanity at the same time and—unfortunately—by the same 
criteria, generally that of insanity; courts historically have done little better.6  The two doctrines 
also meet with the same generally disdainful attitude, as incompetence, like insanity, appears to 
many to be a mechanism by which perpetrators of criminal acts can escape accountability.7  But 
legal insanity and adjudicative competence are importantly distinct: the former looks to whether 
a person is able to understand the nature and quality of her acts, so as to justify attachment of 
criminal consequences, while the latter looks to whether a defendant is possessed of sufficient 
capacity to defend her own interests within the various stages of an ensuing prosecution.8
Though the insanity defense claims the lion’s share of attention, adjudicative competence 
is far more important.  Certainly it has a much deeper reach into the defendant population.  
Indeed, one commentator has asserted that “[v]irtually every criminal defendant who appears to 
defendant after his offense but before trial, sentence, or execution.  See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24 (9th
ed. 1783); M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (1736). 
5 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998); ABA 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.6(b) (1989).
6 See RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 16, 51 (1980); Bruce J. Winick, 
Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 921, 982 & nn.277-79 (1985) (“Clinicians, 
particularly psychiatrists, historically have misunderstood the legal issues involved with incompetency, frequently 
confusing it with legal insanity or with the clinical definition of psychosis.”).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999) (recounting multiple competency determinations in 
case against Vinny “Chin” Gigante). Gigante, who was widely believed to be malingering, inspired a storyline in 
The Sopranos in which Uncle Junior feigns incompetence (but later develops symptoms of incompetence).  See
http://www.hbo.com/sopranos/episode/season4/episode48.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
8 See, e.g., Godinez, 509 U.S. at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (legal standards attending insanity and competence 
are procedurally and substantively distinct); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 739 & n.26 (1972) (same). Persons 
are presumed to be both competent at the time of criminal proceedings and sane at the time of the offense, but may 
be found both incompetent and insane (presumably in a forensic inquiry before trial, for incompetence will bar trial); 
competent and insane (which must be the case whenever a defendant goes to trial but prevails on the insanity 
defense); or incompetent and sane (in which case we attempt to restore competence so imposition of criminal 
consequences may be determined on the merits).  Conflating the two inquiries creates potential for serious injustice, 
for example, by subjecting the incompetent but sane person to trial because she understands right from wrong, 
despite the fact that she is not in a position adequately to protect her own interests.  See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364 
(consequences of being tried while incompetent are “dire”).
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be mentally ill at any time within the criminal trial process is examined for competency,”9 as 
compared with the extremely small number of defendants who mount an insanity defense.10
Actual or suspected adjudicative incompetence affects a consistently significant percentage of 
misdemeanor and felony defendants:11 it is implicated in as many of 8% of cases,12 accounts for 
tens of thousands of admissions to inpatient medical facilities every year,13 and easily is the most 
common subject of mental health testimony in criminal cases.14 The consequences of an 
incompetence adjudication are, from a defendant’s perspective, grave: such a finding may well 
translate into long-term confinement, particularly for those defendants deemed dangerous to 
themselves or others, without opportunity for a finding of guilt or innocence.15 Indeed, among 
9 Winick, supra note 6, at 924 & n.6.  Cf. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 192, 197 (surveyed judges granted 
requests for competency evaluations whenever issue raised, regardless of perception as to necessity).
10 “The insanity defense is raised in only about 1% of felony cases in the United States, and although success rates 
vary widely across jurisdictions, it is successful only in 26% of the cases where it is raised.”  David R. Katner, 
Raising Mental Health Issues-Other than Insanity-In Juvenile Delinquency Defense, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 73, n. 1 
(2000) (quoting Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The Treatment of Mentally Disordered Offenders, 3 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 126, 127 (1997)).  See generally Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the 
Insanity Defense, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 63 (1994); Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of 
Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331 (1991).
11 A surprisingly large number of defendants accused of low-level crimes are referred for competence evaluation, 
despite the relatively lenient possible punishment as compared to the potentially long- term nature of an 
incompetence commitment, whether for evaluation, treatment, or both.  See Winick, supra note 6, at 941-42 & 
nn.82-85; ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 56 (30% of referred defendants in 1978 study charged with 
disturbing the peace); Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 66, 79 & n.54 (1972) (1950s-era study indicated that within questioned-competence population 
accused misdemeanants far outnumbered felons).  But see ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 52-53 (reporting 
finding that those accused of violent interpersonal crimes disproportionately referred).
12 See Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Mental Competency Evaluations: Guidelines for Judges and Attorneys, 
COURT REV. 28, 28 (Summer 2000) (2-8% of felony defendants are referred); POYTHRESS ET AL.,, supra note 2, at 9 
(8%); but see Winick, supra note 6, at 928 & n.21 (1973 study of Manhattan  cases showed 1% of defendants 
referred).
13 See Patricia A. Zapf & Jodi L. Viljoen, Issues and Considerations Regarding the Use of Assessment Instruments 
in the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 351, 352 (2003) (recent estimate of 60,000); 
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 50 (same); Zapf & Roesch, supra note 12, at 28 (25-39,000 evaluations in 
United States annually); THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS 79 (2d ed. 2003) (25,000).
14 “In 1994, the American Bar Association's Committee on Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards noted that ‘the 
issue of present mental incompetence, quantitatively speaking, is the single most important issue in the criminal 
mental health field.’"  See MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, Executive Summary, 
http://macarthur.virginia.edu/adjudicate.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).  See also Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 
352 (“competency evaluations are the single most significant mental health inquiry pursued in the criminal justice 
system”).
15 See, e.g., Jackson, 406 U.S. at 715.
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inpatients with criminal-justice-system involvement, those with questioned competence or who 
have been adjudicated incompetent far outnumber those for whom insanity at the time of the 
offense is the issue—perhaps by a margin as great as 100 to 1.16
Despite the evident importance of adjudicative competence, and despite its solid 
historical pedigree,17 it remains a surprisingly neglected and ill-defined area of law.18 This is 
despite the fact that the governing legal standards appear straightforward.  The law is clear, for 
example, that a criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right not to be tried, 
convicted, sentenced, or executed while incompetent.19  The substantive meaning of 
“incompetence” might appear similarly clear, but in fact is theoretically slippery.20  The meaning 
of each term embedded within the Dusky standard—notably the distinction between a “rational” 
and a “factual” understanding—has escaped significant elaboration by courts and theorists.21  It 
16 See Winick, supra note 6, at 19 n.3; see also Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 66 n.1 (1967 study found over half 
of criminal offenders in surveyed hospitals admitted for incompetence while insanity acquittees accounted for 4%) 
(citing P. SCHEIDEMANDEL & C. KANNO, THE MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 20 (1969)).
17 See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (“The rule that a criminal defendant who is incompetent
should not be required to stand trial has deep roots in our common-law heritage.”); Cooper, 517 U.S. at 357 (citing 
King v. Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. 307, 311 (1790) and King v. Pritchard, 7 Car. & P. 303, 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (1836));
Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899); United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887 (D.C. Cir. 1835); 
Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 626 (1874); Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
18 See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
539, 540-41 (1993).  This neglect is most pronounced in the academic legal literature; the forensic literature is 
significantly more developed.  See, e.g., RICHARD I. FREDERICK ET AL., EXAMINATIONS OF COMPETENCY TO STAND 
TRIAL: FOUNDATIONS IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW (2004); GRISSO, supra note 13; POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2; 
Zapf & Roesch, supra note 12; PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 119-85 (Gary Melton et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1997). 
19 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 389; Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).  
While the Court has left open a small window for experimentation with “innocence-only” adjudications of the 
incompetent, see Jackson, 406 U.S. at 740-41 & n.29-31, that invitation has not been answered.  Further, a different 
substantive standard of “competence” applies in the execution context.  See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 399
(1986); see also note 53, infra.
20 See Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 92 (“The present substantive standard for competency is elusive.”); Zapf & 
Roesch, supra note 12, at 28 (“although the concept of competency to stand trial has been long established in law, its 
definition, as exemplified by the ambiguities of Dusky, has never been explicit”).
21 See Zapf & Roesch, supra note 12, at 28 (crucial terms within Dusky standard ill-defined); Zapf & Viljoen, supra
note 13, at 352; United States v. Housh, 89 F. Supp.2d 1227, 1229 (D. Kan. 2000) (few cases “have given meaning 
to the ‘rational understanding’ phraseology used by the Dusky court”).
The “rational understanding” test appears in both the “communication with counsel” and “understanding of 
the proceedings” prongs of the Dusky standard.  There would appear to be no meaningful distinction between the 
terms as used in these two prongs; further, courts seldom address them separately.  One sense in which the first 
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is also highly unpredictable in application, in large part because the task of implementing Dusky
generally falls to forensic experts, to whom courts defer heavily but to whom firm guidance as to 
the legal standard is seldom given.22  These experts—typically psychologists and psychiatrists, 
but sometimes specialists in other areas of medicine and the mind sciences23—may differ wildly 
in approach, theoretical framework, understanding of the relevant legal constructs, and 
conclusions.  Factually similar cases therefore may meet different outcomes; indeed, it is 
common for different experts to reach diametrically opposed conclusions in the same case.24
Forensic experts and legal theorists have collaborated, particularly in very recent years, to 
formulate standardized mechanisms for defining and measuring competence-relevant facts, but 
these tests are not yet widely used, despite their promise of promoting some measure of 
uniformity.25
requirement might be independently significant is where a rational defendant lacks mechanical ability to 
communicate.  Cf. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 715 .  The type of irrationality about which Dusky is primarily concerned, 
though, is a rational decision-making deficit, which might affect both understanding of the proceedings and ability 
to communicate with counsel.  See Part I.B., infra.
22 See, e.g., Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 364 (showing agreement rates of almost 100%, though “the typical 
forensic evaluation is left largely unguided”); Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 193, 193, 199 -200 & nn.28-30 (2004) (35% of surveyed judges never disagreed with an 
expert’s assessment of competency; 65% rarely or occasionally disagreed); ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 17 
(“judges rarely base their decisions on anything but the concluding statement in the psychiatric report to the court.”); 
Medina, 505 U.S. at 465 (“Competency determinations by and large turn on the testimony of psychiatric experts, not 
lawyers.”) (citing study showing rates of court agreement with experts’ recommendations “typically exceeding 
90%”).
23 See Winick, supra note 6 at 930 & nn.29-30 (historical reliance on psychiatrists giving way to increasing reliance 
on psychologists, social workers, and examiners from other disciplines); see also LEDOUX, supra note 1, at 39 
(defining “mind sciences”).
24 See, e.g., Morris et al., supra note 22, at 215-16; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (four experts expressed 
range of opinions and conclusions).
25 See generally POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2.  See also GRISSO, supra note 13, at 80-81 (low rates of reported 
use of forensic assessment instruments); Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 363-64 (same).
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In short, adjudicative competence, despite its enormous importance, is on whole a 
surprisingly ramshackle affair.26  It is poorly understood, undertheorized, and inconsistently 
implemented.
This Article proposes that a coherent theory and practice of adjudicative competence 
requires a robustly articulated concept of the baseline rationality we expect of criminal 
defendants.  The first step in such an articulation is recognition that the Dusky standard embraces 
a requirement of “decisional competence,” that is, the ability to make, communicate, and 
implement minimally rational and self-protective choices within the unique context of the 
criminal case.27 Further, both cognition and emotion—colloquially, thinking and feeling—make 
important contributions to such rational decision-making capacity.
Part I.A situates adjudicative competence within a family of law-relevant competencies 
and briefly outlines the decision points at which it may affect any given criminal proceeding.  
Part I.B demonstrates that decisional competence is inherent in the “rational understanding” 
component of the Dusky standard.  Part I.C then articulates the necessary components of the 
rational decision-making on which a criminal defendant’s decisional competence depends.  
Drawing on certain courts’ analysis of the disruptive effects of psychotic thought disorder, this 
Section models how an appropriately fine-grained analysis of competence will seek to articulate 
precisely where in the decision-making process the defendant has gone astray and explain why 
those defects implicate ability to represent her own interests within a criminal proceeding.
Part II then argues that the role of emotion is wrongly neglected in the traditional account 
of decision-making, including its application to adjudicative competence, and that attention to 
26 See Winick, supra note 6, at 922 (adjudicative competency is the “status in the criminal mental health system that 
is perhaps most frequently misunderstood by attorneys, judges, and mental health professionals, as well as by the 
public”).
27 The term was coined by Bonnie.  Bonnie, supra note 18, at 567.  See also Part I.B., infra.
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emotion’s role illuminates certain threats to competence that are not perceptible with a solely 
cognitive view.  The historical privileging of cognition within adjudicative competence mirrors 
the traditional, if of late largely discredited, disparagement and neglect of emotion within both 
law and the mind sciences. Part II.A therefore calls special attention to emotion’s role in 
decision-making.  Part II.B then explores two illustrative contexts in which a focus on emotion 
will yield results that a cognitive inquiry likely will not: cases in which a defendant suffers from 
a severe psychiatric mood disorder or from organic brain damage, where one (or both) conditions 
unreasonably interferes with decision-relevant emotional perception, processing, and expression.  
Existing legal theory and forensic testing methods do not explicitly account for competence-
relevant emotional dysfunction, and a predominantly cognitive approach is likely to miss or 
discount its impact.
Part III addresses weighty issues of implementation and policy, asking how a focus on 
the thinking-and-feeling elements of rational decision-making might be applied and whether 
such an application would further the goals of the adjudicative competence doctrine without 
unduly threatening other valuable societal goals.  This Part argues that the transparency benefits 
of this approach are substantial and, further, that it  could be implemented with an acceptable 
level of reliability and consistency.  Part III proposes further that while this approach may 
generate tensions with other social goods—such as promoting defendant autonomy and 
protecting public safety—it will not add appreciably to those tensions already attending the 
adjudicative competence inquiry.
This Article concludes that a proper view of the Dusky standard requires that, when 
judging whether a defendant is competent to decide for herself how to navigate the shoals of 
criminal prosecution, we look to both her thought processes and emotional functioning. 
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I. Rational Understanding and Rational Decision-Making
Adjudicative competence doctrine, like all law-relevant competencies, traditionally has 
sought to balance competing interests.  On the side of finding competence wherever possible are 
respect for a defendant’s autonomy and the state’s interest in enforcing its criminal law; the 
countervailing interest is, fundamentally, that of protecting those who cannot protect 
themselves.28  Significantly, the common-law doctrine of competence is thought to have 
developed “‘as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally incompetent 
defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to 
defend himself.’”29  Prosecution of an incompetent defendant is thought to be an unfair fight of 
the worst kind, one that threatens grave harm to the individual, threatens reliability of outcome, 
and erodes the dignity of the process.  Adjudicative competence thus is “fundamental to an 
adversary system of justice.”30  For the adversary system to have legitimacy, the defendant must 
be meaningfully present as an autonomous actor capable of taking, should she so choose, 
permissible steps to attempt to protect herself from the assertion of state power.
Adjudicative competence therefore may be implicated at any stage in a criminal proceeding
at which it appears that the defendant may lack such self-protective capacity, and—as the 
following Sections demonstrate—at each such juncture the operative inquiry is whether she is 
capable of making rational decisions in service of her defense.  While this focus on “decisional 
competence” has not been explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court, it is implicit in the caselaw; 
indeed, it is hard to imagine a viable concept of competence that excludes it.  Accepting a role 
28 See, e.g., Medina, 505 U.S. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bonnie, supra note 18, at 551-53; Morris et al., 
supra note 22, at 201 & n.38; Winick, supra note 6, at 949-52 & n.134.
29 Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (quoting Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 
U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960)).
30 Drope, 420 U.S. at 171; see also Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364.  The adversarial nature of the adjudicative competence 
construct is perhaps what most distinguishes it from other law-relevant competencies, particularly capacity to 
consent to medical treatment.
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for decisional competence requires a theory as to the necessary components of rational decision-
making with reference to the particular decisions facing criminal defendants.31 This Part 
undertakes an articulation of those components and, using examples from certain cases involving 
psychotic defendants, demonstrates how such an approach promotes accuracy and transparency 
in competence determinations.
A. Introduction to Adjudicative Competence
Adjudicative competence is but one in a family of legal competency constructs that 
includes capacity to consent to or refuse medical care and research, enter into a contract, execute 
a will, and handle one’s own property and finances.32  Some legal (in)competencies are status-
based—for example, the law categorically deems children unable to make any number of 
decisions on their own behalf—but the majority are individually-determined departures from a 
baseline assumption of autonomy.33
Three common threads tie all law-relevant competencies together.  First, competence is 
best understood as (to borrow a term familiar to the sciences but relatively foreign to law) an 
open-textured construct, the meaning of which “can never be fully reducible to a set of concrete 
observations and observational terms.”34 Because competence “is an abstraction” that “retains 
the elusive quality of an idea,” law provides “broad discretion in determining whether a set of 
31 See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 548 (“The greatest need for theoretical development arises in relation to decisional 
competence.”); see also id. at 571 (“case law on decisional competence in criminal adjudication” is “skimpy”).
32 See GRISSO, supra note 13, at 7.  Competence to consent to and refuse medical treatment is perhaps the most 
explored of these.  See generally THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 
TO TREATMENT (1998).
33 See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Ought we to Require Emotional Capacity as Part of Decisional Competence? 8 
KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 377, 378 (1999) (“Contemporary ideas of competence are tied inextricably to the ideal 
of self-determination in modern Western societies.”).
34 ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 12-13 (“no absolute set of facts is ever dispositive of competency,” though 
the “’rationally consult, assist, and comprehend’ standard of Dusky (and the surrounding cases) is an attempt, albeit 
rather vague, to set forth the theoretical terms of the competency construct”) (emphases in original); see also
GRISSO, supra note 13, at 22-23; Bonnie, supra note 18, at 549 & n.43.
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case facts satisfies the criteria.”35  Second, connecting all legal competencies is the recognition 
that “some individuals may not have the capacities to make important decisions in their lives” 
and that these “incapacities may jeopardize their welfare or that of others.” 36  Law therefore 
provides a mechanism for identifying such individuals and in such cases authorizes (and 
sometimes obligates) the state to curtail their rights.37  Courts make these decisions with
deliberately heavy reliance on mental health professionals.38 Third, because determinations of 
legal incompetence are by nature profoundly paternalistic,39 the objective is not to ensure that an 
individual has the highest possible level of decision-making capacity , but rather to avoid state 
intervention if she has the bare minimum required.40
Moreover, the relevant decision-making capacity is utterly context-dependent; no single 
legal criterion or test applies across all legal competencies, and the law does not presume that 
(in)competence in one arena will imply or affect (in)competence in another.41 The consequence 
of incompetence also will vary: in some situations, such as inability to handle one’s financial 
affairs, surrogate decision-making may be permitted; in others, the subject will be unable to 
access a good, such as dangerous medical treatment to which she is incompetent to consent; and 
in others, such as inability to provide for the basics of one’s survival, the person may be 
institutionalized.
35 GRISSO, supra note 13, at 22-23.
36 Id. at 2.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and Research: MacArthur and 
Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103, 104 (1999) (“the tension between autonomy and paternalism remains 
central to the assessment of competency”).
40 See Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 85; see also Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 378.
41 See GRISSO, supra note 13, at 9; Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 361 (empirical studies show that “assessed 
competencies in one area of functioning are rarely homogenous with competencies in other areas of functioning”); 
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 183 (2003) (defendant may be incompetent to be tried but competent to refuse 
medical treatment).
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As part of the universe of legal competencies, adjudicative competence, broadly defined, 
includes competence to waive Miranda rights; plead guilty; dismiss counsel; stand trial and 
make the various decisions required during trial; pursue or abandon appeals and other avenues 
for post-conviction relief; and be executed.42
Within any given criminal case, then, the issue of competence may be raised at multiple 
junctures.43  After a defendant is arrested and charged, any party (or the trial judge) may raise the 
issue of possible incompetence.  The court will then determine whether there is a bona fide doubt 
as to competence.44  If not, the case proceeds (though the process may well begin again if 
incompetence is argued at a later point).  If so, the court will order an inquiry in conformance 
with the law of the jurisdiction, which will almost certainly entail examination by a mental health 
professional (and likely more than one) in an inpatient or outpatient setting.  A clinical expert (or 
experts) will likely submit a written report and testify at a hearing, and probably will proffer a 
recommendation as to the ultimate issue of legal competence.45  The trial court is 
overwhelmingly likely to agree with the expert recommendation.46  If multiple experts give 
42 GRISSO, supra note 13, at 3.  Because Miranda competence and the competence of juveniles both are the subject 
of an extensive and generally separate jurisprudence, neither is addressed in this Article. However, some of the
arguments herein may well apply with equal force to juveniles. See, e.g., MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AND 
ASSESSMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (Thomas Grisso et al. eds., 2005); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence 
to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
333 (2003).  
43 For a graphical rendering of this process, see ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 131-38 & Figure 5-1.
44 See Drope, 420 U.S. at 162; Pate, 383 U.S. at 375 .
45 See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 18 (experts “typically testify in conclusory terms, often parroting the 
statutory language”); Bonnie, supra note 18, at 550 (“judges practically insist on ultimate issue opinion in reports 
and testimony on competence to stand trial”).  There is a substantial debate as to whether a competence examiner 
ever should proffer an opinion as to the ultimate issue of adjudicative incompetence. See Zapf & Viljoen, supra
note 13, at 364  n.7; GRISSO, supra note 13, at 81-82; Christopher Slobogin, The ‘ultimate issue’ issue, 7 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 259 (1989). 
46 See note 21, supra (agreement rates near 100%).
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differing testimony, the court is likely to side with the prosecution’s expert, as the burden of 
proof as to incompetence generally will rest with the defendant.47
If the defendant is found competent, trial will continue (again, with the same caveat as to 
new evidence of incompetence, which may take the form of increasingly erratic behavior at 
trial).  If, however, the defendant is found incompetent, she will be subjected to a period of 
continued evaluation and treatment—potentially including involuntary medication should certain 
stringent requirements be met48—in accordance with jurisdiction-specific timelines, bounded by 
an outside requirement of “reasonableness.”49  Should competence at any point be restored, 
proceedings will resume; but should the defendant be deemed unlikely to be restored to 
competence within a “reasonable” time, she must be released or civil commitment proceedings 
commenced.50  During a period of indeterminate incompetence it is not clear whether the 
criminal charges may remain pending, or for how long.51
Finally, should a competent defendant be sentenced to death, she may face further inquiry 
should she decide to waive all appeals,52 and may have a claim of incompetence to be executed if 
she has experienced a substantial decline in mental health while incarcerated.53
47 See Medina, 505 U.S. at 451-52 (state may place burden on defendant to show incompetence by a preponderance 
of the evidence); Cooper, 517 U.S. at 348 (state may not impose clear and convincing evidence burden on 
defendant).
48 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
49 See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (unconstitutional to confine defendant indefinitely solely on basis of adjudicative 
incompetence; confinement may continue only for a reasonable period to determine likelihood of competence 
restoration or be justified by progress toward that goal).
50 See id. Many or most adjudicatively incompetent defendants likely can be shown to be dangerous to themselves 
or others, subjecting them in most jurisdictions to civil commitment.   Some commentators have complained that 
Jackson has not prevented permanent commitment for the adjudicatively incompetent but merely has shifted the 
mechanism.  See Winick, supra note 6, at 927 & n.17, 940-41 & nn.73-79; ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 
150, 357; Burt & Morris, supra note 11.
51 This question was left unanswered by Jackson.  See 406 U.S. at 740 (declining to reach question of whether due 
process prohibits “holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over the head of one who will never have a chance 
to prove his innocence”).
52 See Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam).
53 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).  The standard for competence to be executed is a relatively minimal 
one, looking to whether the prisoner has “mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the 
reasons why it was imposed on him,” id. at 403-04 (quoting FL. STAT. § 922.07 (1985)), which generally is 
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Unfortunately, the substantive meaning of the competency construct underlying this 
relatively straightforward procedure remains largely undeveloped. But one strong theme that 
emerges from the cases, albeit largely sub rosa, is that—consistent with competence inquiries 
generally—the primary concern should be whether the defendant is capable of making critical 
decisions. As the following Section demonstrates, such “decisional competence” is an integral
component of the Dusky standard.  
B. Decisional Competence as a Component of Adjudicative 
Competence
The roots of the decisional competence construct may be found in Dusky itself.54  In 
Dusky the Court was faced with a defendant who, according to medical experts, suffered from 
schizophrenia but “understood what he was charged with, knew that if there was a trial it would 
be before a judge and jury, knew that if found guilty he could be punished, … knew who his 
attorney was and that it was his duty to protect the defendant’s rights,” and could furnish at least 
some relevant historical information with substantial accuracy.55  His incompetence, they 
testified, stemmed not from inability to grasp factual concepts but, rather, from the “confused 
thinking” caused by his mental illness, which they asserted had rendered him unable to “interpret 
reality from unreality.”56 Nonetheless, the district court found Dusky competent to proceed to 
trial.57
interpreted to require only a showing that those to be executed “know the fact of their impending execution and the 
reason for it,” id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).   If this is the correct standard, competence to be executed likely 
requires little or none of the decision-making capacity discussed with regard to adjudicative competence in Part I.B., 
infra.  However, such capacity might be relevant were a more expansive notion of competence to be executed 
adopted.  See, e.g., id. at 408, 414-15 (appearing to regard as relevant whether condemned inmate can confer with 
counsel and contribute to an assessment of the fairness and accuracy of the sentence); SANFORD H. KADISH & 
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 877-78 (7th ed. 2001); ABA 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-5.6(b) (1989).
54 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).  
55 Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 388, 389-92 (8th Cir. 1959).
56 Id.
57 See id. at 389-90.
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In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court accepted verbatim the Solicitor General’s 
proposed definition of competence: 
[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that “the defendant [is] oriented to 
time and place and [has] some recollection of events” … the “test must be 
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”58
Thus, the “factual understanding” displayed by Dusky was necessary but not sufficient for 
competence.  What was also required was some sort of “rational understanding,” which, though 
apparently crucial, remained undefined.  
Subsequent cases attempting to define what evidence would raise a bona fide doubt as to 
Dusky incompetence have yielded some additional hints as to what types of “irrationality” might 
be relevant.  The Court, while resisting any attempt to define “a general standard” for such 
evidence,59 has delineated certain facts that generally warrant further inquiry—such as a “history 
of pronounced irrational behavior”60 or a recent suicide attempt61—and others that are
insufficient to foreclose the inquiry even if relevant to the ultimate determination—such as lucid 
speech and behavior in the courtroom62 or a lack of “delusional thinking.”63  Despite these clues, 
the value added by a requirement of “rational” as well as “factual” understanding has remained 
unclear.  
58 362 U.S. at 402 (quoting from Solicitor General’s brief).  The experts defined “oriented to time, place, and 
person” thus: “This means that he is able to know the day of the week, the hour, the place in which he finds himself 
geographically, and the circumstances of his present situation.  He knows he is in a court room; he knows the day of 
the week and the day of the year, and he knows that you are his attorney and Judge Smith is the judge.” Dusky, 271 
F.2d at 389.
Though Dusky pertained only to the proper interpretation of the federal competence statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
4244 (2005), some version of the Dusky test now has been adopted in virtually every jurisdiction. See Winick, 
supra note 6, at 923 n.4; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §4.04 (1962).
59 Drope, 420 U.S. at 172.
60 Pate, 383 U.S. at 385.
61 See Drope, 420 U.S. at 177, 179.
62 See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86.
63 Drope, 420 U.S. at 177-78.
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That situation changed somewhat with Godinez v. Moran,64 in which the Court read a 
decision-making focus into the standard for Dusky rationality.  Godinez answered a brewing 
debate among the lower courts and commentators as to whether different substantive standards 
of competency applied to different aspects, or at different stages, of a criminal proceeding.65  The 
short answer, the Court held, was no.  
Richard Allen Moran, charged with killing the owner and a patron of a bar as well as his 
former wife, was found competent not only to stand trial but also to waive his rights to an 
attorney and trial; after a colloquy, the trial court accepted his waiver of counsel and plea; and he 
was convicted and sentenced to death.66  Moran later argued that he had been “mentally 
incompetent to represent himself.”67  The Ninth Circuit agreed, reasoning that while Moran 
might have been Dusky-competent for purposes of standing trial with counsel, he should have 
been found competent to waive counsel and plead guilty only if determined also to have “the 
capacity for ‘reasoned choice’ among the alternatives available to him.”68  The Ninth Circuit 
interpreted such capacity for “reasoned choice” as articulating a different (and more stringent) 
standard than that outlined in Dusky.69
64 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
65 The chief proponent of a “Dusky-plus” standard for certain critical decisions was Bonnie.  See Bonnie, supra note 
18.
66 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 392-93.
67 Id. at 393.
68 Id. at 394.  This “reasoned choice” standard was drawn from Rees v. Peyton, in which the Court held that a death-
row inmate was competent to waive appeals only if he were shown to have “capacity to appreciate his position and 
make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is 
suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”  
384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (per curiam); see also Godinez, 509 U.S. at 415 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The standard 
applied by the Ninth Circuit in this case—the “reasoned choice” standard—closely approximates the “rational 
choice” standard set forth in Rees.”). 
69 Similarly, Bonnie had argued that decision-making capacity was not required in every case.  Rather, he explicitly 
“unhinge[ed] decisional competence from the Dusky formula,” with the former coming into play only after Dusky
competence is established and certain decisions faced by the defendant.  Bonnie, supra note 18, at 577-87.
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The Court rejected the notion that there was a substantive difference between “reasoned 
choice” and “rational understanding.”70  Listing the wide array of choices required of defendants 
whether they go to trial or plead guilty, the Court held that the same standard applied to both 
universes of decision-making.71  The only sense in which a higher standard applied is that certain 
decisions—such as those made by Moran to discharge counsel and plead guilty—additionally 
require a separate determination that they were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.72
In the end, the Court appeared to regard the dispute as one of semantics, as it believed capacity 
for “reasoned choice” or “rational choice” to mean nothing other than a “rational understanding” 
in the Dusky sense.73
Decided more than three decades after Dusky, Godinez represents the Court’s most 
specific effort to explain what “rational understanding” might mean.74  The effort is in one sense 
frustratingly opaque: after Godinez, “rational understanding” likely means what the Ninth Circuit 
meant when it spoke of capacity for “reasoned choice,” though it might mean something slightly 
different and somehow less demanding.75 What is clear, though, is the Court’s focus on 
70 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397-98 (how the standards might differ “is not readily apparent,” and even respondent 
argued that the distinction was “merely one of ‘terminology’”); see also id. at 398 n.9; id. at 407 (pointing to “the 
lack of any clear distinction between a ‘rational understanding’ and a ‘reasoned choice’ in this case”) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).
71 See id. at 398-400.
72 See id. at 400-02 (citing, inter alia, Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam), and Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).  As the Court clarified:
The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he 
has the ability to understand the proceedings. … The purpose of the “knowing and voluntary” 
inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the 
significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.  
509 U.S. at 401 n.12.  “In this sense,” then, “there is a ‘heightened’ standard for pleading guilty and for waiving the 
right to counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence.”  Id. at 401.
73 See id. at 397-98.
74 See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 593 (before Godinez, the Court had “not had the occasion to elaborate further on the 
substantive aspects of the competence doctrine”).
75 509 U.S. at 397-98 (holding that, were there a difference between reasoned choice and rational understanding, the 
latter describes the required level of competence).
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defendant decision-making as the crucial capacity to which the rationality aspect of the 
competence construct is directed. 
To be sure, Godinez did not use the term “decisional competence,” urged on it by prominent 
commentators,76 or make absolutely explicit that the Dusky standard was meant to embrace such 
a concept.  Indeed, the dissenters complained bitterly that the majority had imposed an unduly 
passive notion of Dusky competence on very consequential decisions.77  Some therefore have 
interpreted Godinez “to mean that defendants’ decision making abilities need not be considered 
when making judgments about their competence, because the Dusky standard makes no specific 
reference to ‘decision making.’”78 But this conclusion is belied by the Godinez majority’s nearly 
single-minded focus on the various decisions that might be required of a criminal defendant.79
Indeed, the Court asserted that 
all criminal defendants—not merely those who plead guilty—may be required to 
make important decisions once criminal proceedings have been initiated.   And 
while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, it is no more 
complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to 
make during the course of a trial.80
That the Dusky standard must be understood to revolve around ability to make rational decisions 
pertaining to one’s status as a criminal defendant was reinforced by Justice Kennedy, who in 
concurrence stated flatly that “[w]hat is at issue here is whether the defendant has sufficient 
competence to take part in a criminal proceeding and to make the decisions throughout its 
course.”81
76 See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 18.
77 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 412-13, 415-16 & n.3.
78 GRISSO, supra note 13, at 73.
79 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399 (“there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably 
higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights”).
80 Id. at 398-99 (therefore, if the “Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not guilty, it is necessarily 
adequate for those who plead guilty”).
81 Id. at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 406-07 (single standard applicable to “the variety of decisions 
that a defendant must make”); 408 (imposing different competence standards “for each decision” would be 
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Accordingly, in very recent years a number of forensic theorists have embraced the 
notion that decisional competence not only survived Godinez but was in fact promoted to a 
protected position within the Dusky standard.82  Significantly, a panel of theorists and 
practitioners who collaborated on a comprehensive, long-term MacArthur foundation 
adjudicative competence study defined decisional competence as a discrete domain and designed 
a forensic assessment instrument specifically to measure such competence.83  The MacArthur 
study also revealed that discrete measurement of decisional competence might “catch” some who 
otherwise would be deemed competent.84 And far from being controversial, the centrality of 
decisional competence is widely accepted in the field of competence to consent to medical 
treatment.85
unworkable).  Moreover, the primacy of decision-making abilities was reaffirmed in Cooper, in which a unanimous 
Court cited Godinez for the proposition that the fundamental unfairness of trying an incompetent defendant stems 
from his inability to make the myriad of decisions, both large and small, concerning the course of his defense.  See
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364.
82 GRISSO, supra note 13, at 73; see also id. at 93 (defining decisional competence as the abilities needed for 
“autonomous decision making with respect to strategic issues that arise in the course of prosecution”); Steven K. 
Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study: Development & Validation of a Research Instrument, 
21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 144, 330 (1997) (the heart of competence is ability “to make rational, self-interested 
decisions”). 
83 See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 38.  The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal 
Adjudication (“MacCAT-CA”) is the first competence assessment instrument to seek to measure decision-making 
capacity directly.  See GRISSO, supra note 13, at 146 (“The MacCAT-CA and the FIT-R come closer than earlier 
instruments to providing information that goes beyond ‘factual understanding’ to begin to address questions of 
defendants’ decision making capacities.  This is an important advance, and instruments that do not provide such 
information are out of step with the evolution of the legal competence construct of competence in recent years.”).  
The MacArthur team, of which Bonnie was part, agreed with Bonnie’s pre-Godinez theory that decisional 
competence becomes of independent significance only in cases in which the defendant is competent to assist 
counsel, and that decisional deficits might be overcome with surrogate decision-making.  These particular aspects of 
their decisional competence formulation are not necessarily supported by Godinez.
84 One quarter of incompetent defendants studied were impaired on at least one decisional competence measure 
despite scoring as unimpaired on measures of competence to assist counsel.  See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 
103-04.  The sample from which this data was obtained was persons who had been deemed incompetent, implying 
that perhaps no discrete measurement is necessary because decisionally-incompetent persons are already being 
captured adequately.  This is not necessarily so.  The data simply show that among those adjudicated incompetent 
there are persons with serious decisional deficits, and we do not know how such persons’ incompetence was 
captured.   It remains possible that where courts and examiners are focusing solely on non-decisional capacities such 
persons may be wrongly deemed competent.
85 See, e.g., Louis C. Charland, Appreciation and Emotion: Theoretical Reflections on the MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study, 8 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 359, 360 (1999) (defining competence to consent to treatment as 
“decision-making capacity”).
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The extent to which a focus on decisional capacity is being implemented in the criminal-
law context, however, unquestionably is hindered by the lack of transparency in the caselaw, in 
which “rational understanding,” not rational decision-making, remains the operative term.  
Expert assessments, which form the sole basis for nearly all judicial determinations of 
adjudicative competence, “tend to give little, if any, attention to decisional competence.”86 Even 
those most prominently advocating a decisional competence approach concede that its precise 
meaning “within the well-established Dusky formula is not clear at present.”87 This confusion 
should be put to rest.  Decisional competence should be recognized as the core of adjudicative 
competence.
C. A Theoretical Model of Competence-Relevant Decision-Making
Having shown that rational decision-making capacity is key to Dusky rational understanding, 
it is essential to define more precisely the decisions at issue.  Some decisions facing criminal 
defendants—for example, strategic calls as to whether to waive indictment or demand certain 
forms of discovery—routinely are entrusted to the attorney, while others plainly are the province 
of the defendant.88  These defendant-driven decisions are whether to demand a jury trial, 
represent oneself, testify on one’s own behalf, be present at trial, or plead guilty.89  More 
broadly, the defendant is thought also to have the right to make global decisions as to the theory 
86 POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.  A 1998 study concluded that examiners “primarily paid attention to 
understanding and appreciation abilities and neglected the defendant’s capacity to make[] decisions in a large 
majority” of reports.  Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 364 (citing to Jennifer Skeem et al., Logic and reliability of 
evaluations of competence to stand trial, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 519 (1998)).  This  trend might shift should the 
MacCAT-CA come to be more widely used.
87 See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 593-94 (courts “are confused” as to “whether and how the components of the Dusky 
formula, as later embellished in Drope, apply to impairments of abilities required for rational decision-making”); 
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at (“Future elaborations on the functional capacities required for adjudicative 
competence may be informed by research that reveals important distinctions between merely assisting counsel (in a 
comparatively passive sense) and the capacity to actively engage in decision making relevant to constructing a 
criminal defense or to weighing options that are presented in the course of the adjudicatory process.”).
88 Bonnie, supra note 18, at 546, 559, 568.
89 See id. at 553 & nn.57-58, 568-69 & nn.102-105, 109. See also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 n.24 (1988) 
(dictum); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Adams v. United States ex rel. Mc Cann, 317 U.S. 269, 
278-81 (1942); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
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of her defense—for example, whether to pursue an insanity defense—and the objectives to be 
pursued by counsel.90  When we speak of decisional competence, then, it is the competence to 
make these choices, and not a more general decision-making ability, about which the law should 
care.  And construing the requirement of rational decision-making capacity in light of the goals 
sought to be balanced by adjudicative competence doctrine,91 we may conclude further that the 
decisional capacity we demand of a criminal defendant is that which renders her capable of 
making critical defendant-driven decisions in a minimally rational and self-protective manner.  
Still, the content of such “rationality” requires yet further explication.  Rationality is far 
from self-defining.92 Though it is difficult to articulate the components of decision-making 
processes, and more difficult still to judge the rationality of their operation, recent decades have 
seen significant advances in our understanding of such processes.93  Exploring the relevance of 
such research for adjudicative competence, and demonstrating how a decision-making focus 
sometimes is invoked in the cases, illuminates an approach that may give substance to the 
sketchy outlines of Dusky rational understanding.
The literature on decision-making is vast,94 but there is some degree of consensus as to 
the necessary building blocks of the types of decisions faced by criminal defendants.  As an 
90 See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 553 n.58; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2 (1986).
91 See pp. 8-9, infra.  See also Steven J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 SO. CAL. L. REV. 251, 254 
(2005); see also Steven J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 
295 (2003) (“How much rational capacity must be impaired under what conditions to warrant excuse or mitigation 
is, of course, a normative, moral, political, and legal question.”).  While Morse’s discussions of rationality are 
positioned within a discussion of responsibility, they nonetheless may inform understanding of the concept within 
the competence construct.
92 Steven J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L. REV. 527, 530 (1996) (“There is no uncontroversial definition of 
rationality.”).
93 See, e.g., Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison, Thinking and Reasoning: A Reader’s Guide, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 1, 3 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005) 
(“Thinking and reasoning, long the academic province of philosophy, have over the past century emerged as core 
topics of empirical investigation and theoretical analysis in the modern fields known as cognitive psychology, 
cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience.”).
94 An overview of this complex topic goes far beyond the project of this Article.  For an introduction to the field, see 
generally THE ROUTINES OF DECISION MAKING (Tilmann Betsch & Susanne Haberstroh eds., 2005); EMERGING 
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initial matter, most agree that a focus on rationality should look to process rather than outcome, 
despite the fact that the latter is far more accessible.95  The danger of adopting a predominantly 
outcome-driven test for competence-relevant rationality is that it may encourage examiners and 
courts simply to substitute their judgments for those of defendants whose choices appear 
misguided.96 Judging reasonableness of outcome can play an important role, as manifestly 
bizarre or self-destructive decisions might be evidence of a faulty process, but it is to that process 
that the search for rationality should be directed.97
Decision-making processes generally may be described as consisting of perception,
understanding, reasoning, and choice.98  One making a “rational” decision should have at least 
minimally intact ability to perceive the world accurately; think coherently about those 
perceptions and thereby form valid understandings; run those understandings through a sound 
reasoning process guided by personally relevant goals; imagine a conclusion logically flowing 
from that process; express that conclusion to others; and formulate and execute a course of action 
flowing logically from the preceding steps.99 Each of these steps is both theoretically and 
practically complex (and a potential site for things to go awry).
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003); 
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); 
RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES (William M. 
Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997).
95 See, e.g., Winick, supra note 6, at 966 (it is both tempting and “easy to confuse the quality of the decision-making 
process with the reasonableness of the result reached”).
96 See, e.g., Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 124 (we should avoid “declaring people who make good choices 
competent and people who make bad choices incompetent”).  See also Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1566 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (Brorby, J., dissenting).
97 See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 575.
98 In the competence context, these abilities generally are grouped under the headings of understanding, 
appreciation, reasoning, and choice. See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 48 (“Taken together, these four criteria 
operationalize the “rationality” requirement to which the Supreme Court referred in Godinez v. Moran.”).  The 
MacCAT-CA, designed to reflect this theory of competence, measures only the first three.  See id. at 59-68 & Table 
3.1.  Because I consider appreciation to be an aspect of understanding, see Part II.A., infra, and believe it important 
to consider the threshold role of perception, I prefer the formulation of perception, understanding, reasoning, and 
choice.
99 See Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, supra note 91, at 255 (offering similar account of rationality in context 
of criminal responsibility); Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 
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The extent to which courts have examined defendants’ competence with reference to a 
decision-making model is quite limited.  However, certain helpful clues as to such a model’s 
utility may be found in the treatment of defendants with severe thought disorder.  
To simplify a somewhat confusing nomenclature, “thought disorder” refers herein to 
dysfunction in cognitive thought processes that is identified by its effect on either the content or 
form of speech.100  A disorder of “thought content” generally will include hallucinations (sensory 
perceptions not based in reality, for example, hearing voices or seeing visions) or delusions 
(understandings and beliefs similarly unrelated to reality).101  One of “thought form” describes a 
“disorganization of underlying thought processes indicated by abnormal speech,” for example, 
1067 (2002); Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 114 (competence to consent to medical treatment requires 
“understanding relevant information; assessing the evidence and forming appropriate beliefs about it; reasoning 
about the evidence with a degree of intactness; and communicating a choice”); Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 379 
(“competence for decision making” consists of “the abilities: to express a choice; to understand relevant 
information; to appreciate the significance of that information for one’s own situation; and to reason with relevant 
information so as to engage in a logical process of weighing options”) (citing Jessica W. Berg et al., Constructing 
Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345 
(1996)).  See also G. Michelle Reid-Proctor et al., Evaluation of legal competency in patients with frontal lobe 
injury, 15 BRAIN INJURY 377, 378 (2001) (components of  legal “competency” are “(a) perception and 
comprehension of a relevant body [of] information; (b) memory and recall of relevant information well enough to 
support further mental evaluation of the informant; (c) the capacity to identify personal options implicit in the 
information and to logically deliberate among the available options based on relative potential risks and benefits; 
and (d) the capacity to make an enduring decision based on prior logical deliberation”).
100 Thought disorder, thus defined, is a type of dysfunction generally occurring “within the context of a more 
extensive psychopathology, including diagnoses as diverse as schizophrenia, mood disorders, certain personality 
disorders, and autism.” Peter Bachman & Tyrone D. Cannon, Cognitive and Neuroscience Aspects of Thought 
Disorder, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 494.  This definition is 
not entirely consistent with that of “formal thought disorder,” which historically has been defined as the speech 
impairment itself rather than the underlying cause.  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
acknowledges the “difficulty inherent in developing an objective definition of ‘thought disorder’” and therefore 
focuses in its description of schizophrenia on the concept of “disorganized speech.”  DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 300 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter “DSM-IV-TR”).  However, the speech disorders 
typical of thought disorder are best regarded as symptoms of underlying defects in cognitive processing.  See
Bachman & Cannon, supra, at 493, 495, 498; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra, at 300 (citing “formal thought disorder” 
as referring to “disorganized thinking”).
101 The DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 299, defines delusions as disorders of thought content, while characterizing 
hallucinations as disorders of perception.
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highly tangential speech (sometimes called a “flight of ideas”) or the confusing jumble of loose 
associations sometimes called “word salad.”102
Persons with severe thought disorder, particularly those diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
often are labeled “psychotic,”103 and psychosis is very strongly associated with findings of 
adjudicative incompetence.104  Indeed, it appears that many examiners regard psychosis as the 
sine qua non of incompetence, starting and ending their analysis with that diagnosis.105
Unfortunately, the underlying rationale as to why the thought disorder associated with psychosis 
is thought to disrupt Dusky rationality seldom is made plain. Indeed, few courts have attempted 
102 Bachman & Cannon, supra note 100, at 495-96; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 300 (describing such
disturbances of speech within schizophrenia).  Cases that explicitly discuss the “disordered thought form” 
manifestation are scarce.  However, it is not unusual to see embedded within cases descriptions of bizarre speech 
that suggest the presence of disordered thought form.  For example, the defendant in Strickland v. Francis exhibited 
various forms of nonsensical speech, including repeated and acontextual use of the word “supplemental,” evidencing 
“’a certain disorganization of thought process.’”  738 F.2d 1542, 1544-45 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984); see also United 
States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293, 294 (2d Cir. 1990) (incompetent defendant’s testimony was “rambling, confused, 
irrelevant, or incomprehensible,” at one point devolving into “a profane and scatological barrage”); State v. 
Haycock, 766 A.2d 720, 722-23 (N.H. 2001) (defendant tended to “ramble” and his “thoughts” were “’tangential’ 
and ‘paranoid’”).  Cf. United States v. Housh, 89 F. Supp.2d 1227, 1230 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting, in support of 
competency finding, that defendant’s “speech was normal in content and form”); Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Charles, 
72 F.3d 401, 405-09 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1995) (paranoid schizophrenic defendant’s record colloquies were “rambling” 
but not entirely “incoherent”; he was deemed competent, including to represent himself and reject an insanity 
defense).  Though the cases do not make this clear, a thought-form disorder could impair the communication with 
counsel prong of Dusky as well as the rational understanding of the proceedings prong.
103 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 297-98 (offering varied definitions of psychosis and psychotic symptoms, all 
of which include delusions or hallucinations, some of which include disorganized speech and behavior); Bachman & 
Cannon, supra note 100, at 500 (psychosis “involves a fundamental ‘loosening of associations’ between ideational 
elements, which results in a conceptual confusion that manifests itself in disordered speech (in addition to other 
symptoms)”).
Note that what this Article defines as “thought disorder” may also be found in non-psychotic mental 
illnesses, such as amnesia, delirium, and dementia.  See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 135-80.  These phenomena 
also may be highly relevant to an adjudicative competence determination.  See, e.g., United States v. Rinchack, 820 
F.2d 1557, 1569 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 900 (10th Cir. 1972); Wilson v. United 
States, 391 F.2d 460, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1968). While these issues go beyond the purview of this Article, the 
methodological approach advocated in this Part applies equally to such mental disorders.
104 See Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Diagnosis, Current Symptomatology, and the Ability to Stand Trial, 3 J. FORENSIC 
PSYCHOL. PRAC. 23, 23-25, 30 (2003) (no non-psychotic individual in sample deemed incompetent, while nearly 
20% of the psychotic defendants were; “research has consistently found that defendants with psychotic disorders are 
more likely to be judged unfit than those with non-psychotic disorders,” and “hallucinations and delusions” are 
particularly associated with such judgments); see also Hoge et al., supra note 83, at 331 (findings of incompetence 
generally associated with diagnosis of schizophrenia with presence of psychotic symptoms); GRISSO, supra note 13, 
at 79.
105 See, e.g., Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 339 (10th Cir. 1991) (examiner “was of the belief that only psychotic 
individuals could be considered competent, and any individual who was non-psychotic was therefore competent”).
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to define Dusky rational understanding at all, let alone by reference to decision-making 
processes.106 There are, however, several prominent exceptions.
Those courts that have attempted to explain the relevance of psychosis to adjudicative 
competence generally have located the operative decision-making defects at the stages of 
perception and understanding.  Perception, or the human body’s transformation of sensory 
stimuli into internal images,107 is a crucial threshold requirement,108 but is not as straightforward 
as it may seem.  Because sensory stimuli are transformed into conscious perceptions by complex
(and largely nonconscious) neural processes, factors ranging from stress to neurological disorder 
can intervene, with sometimes seriously distorting consequences, between percept and 
perception.109 Once an object is perceived, with or without prior distortion, a decider will form 
thoughts and beliefs—or understandings—about it.110  Generally accurate understandings about 
relevant aspects of the external world are, like perception, necessary but not sufficient for 
competent decision-making.111
106 See, e.g,. Housh, 89 F. Supp.2d at 1229 (“few reported Tenth Circuit cases have given meaning to the ‘rational 
understanding’ phraseology used by the Dusky Court”).
107 William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and decision research: Some historical context, in 
RESEARCH IN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 94, at 3, 7 (perception is the process by which objects 
in the environment stimulate a person’s sensory organs “to produce multiple cues … as to the object’s identity and 
properties”).
108 It is hard to imagine a competent defendant who lacks anything approaching normal perceptive abilities; we 
would not, for example, consider trying a comatose person.  Perceptive deficits short of coma may also cause 
incompetence.  Theon Jackson, for example, who was deaf and could not speak, was considered incompetent in 
large part because his disabilities were so extreme as to forestall any communication with counsel.  See Jackson, 406
U.S. at 717-18 (noting as well that Jackson was developmentally disabled)  Though one imagines that a defendant 
like Jackson could now be rendered competent because of improved methods for communicating with the 
developmentally disabled and hearing impaired, it is possible to imagine a defendant for whom no accommodation 
is sufficient.
109 See, e.g., Goldstein & Hogarth, supra note 107, at 7 (perception involves “the psychological construction or 
inference of a percept from an incomplete and fallible collection of sensory cues”).  
110 “Thinking,” or “the systematic transformation of mental representations of knowledge to characterize actual or 
possible states of the world, often in service of goals,” is a bridge between perception and understanding. Holyoak 
& Morrison, supra note 93, at 2 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 1.
111 Recall that Dusky could understand of the parameters of his situation and relate with accuracy certain relevant 
facts.  See Dusky, 271 F.2d at 389.  See also Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 113 (“Pure understanding” necessary 
but not sufficient; because “making a decision in one’s best interests requires assessing how those interests are likely 
to be affected, the patient must be able to form adequate beliefs in order to be a competent decision maker”).
Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
25
Defendants with severe psychosis frequently display perceptual and understanding 
processes that are so profoundly distorted as to obviate competence.  Such was the conclusion in 
Lafferty v. Cook,112 an unusually thoughtful decision by a sharply split Tenth Circuit panel. 
Ronald Lafferty was diagnosed as suffering from a “paranoid delusional state” but deemed 
competent; he then attempted suicide by hanging, and four examiners opined that Lafferty’s 
“paranoid delusional system,” aggravated by oxygen deprivation to his brain, had rendered him 
incompetent by impairing “his ability to perceive and interpret reality.”113  Lafferty’s delusions 
included the strong belief that all those involved in his case—including his lawyer—were part of 
a “man-made corrupt order” against which he was required by God to rebel.  Because he 
displayed factual understanding of the proceedings,114 the majority recognized that its task was to 
determine the meaning of Dusky’s rational understanding requirement.115  After examining the 
trial record in Dusky the majority determined that “a defendant lacks the requisite rational 
understanding if his mental condition precludes him from perceiving accurately, interpreting, 
and/or responding appropriately to the world around him.”116  Thus, the majority concluded,
“sufficient contact with reality” is the “touchstone for ascertaining the existence of a rational 
understanding.”117
112 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1992). Lafferty, a former Mormon who was excommunicated from the Church of 
Latter-Day Saints for “unorthodox religious views,” murdered several persons whom he believed had supported his 
wife in leaving him.
113 Id. at 1552.
114 Like Dusky, Lafferty “physically knew the nature of the proceedings against him, and their possible 
consequences.”  Id.
115 Id. at 1550  (“The aspect of the Dusky standard that is the critical focus of attention in this case is the requirement 
that a defendant have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”). 
116 Id. at 1551.
117 Id. (“The state court paid lip service to Dusky’s requirement that competency requires a rational understanding 
which is different from, and more than, factual understanding.  … Nonetheless, in view of the evidence that 
Lafferty’s illness interfered with his accurate perception of reality, the court’s statements that Lafferty’s 
understanding was rational simply renders that requirement a nullity.”).
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This test, focused primarily on the effects of psychosis on perception and understanding,
has been adopted by a small handful of other courts. 118  In In re Heidnik, for example, the Third 
Circuit found a death row inmate incompetent to abandon appeals119 because his decisions were 
based on a flawed “perception of reality,”120 including “fixed false beliefs” that his victims had 
killed themselves and that his execution would lead to the end of capital punishment.  These 
delusional beliefs were “all-encompassing in nature” and colored “every aspect of his cognitive 
functioning,”121 with the result that Heidnik was “seeing people as other than what they are.”122
A similar approach was recently taken as well in Utah v. Mitchell, in which Brian David Mitchell 
was found incompetent to stand trial for the kidnapping of Salt Lake City teenager Elizabeth 
Smart.123  After determining that Mitchell suffered from a delusional disorder characterized by 
fixed, false beliefs (including that Smart was destined to be his “celestial wife” and that God 
required his conviction and imprisonment in order to trigger an eventual personal battle with the 
Antichrist),124 the court concluded that his “ability to accurately perceive and interpret external 
118 The Second Circuit, in a pre-Lafferty decision, agreed that a defendant’s “impaired sense of reality” can, where it 
prevents him from “focusing on his legal needs and acting effectively on his intellectual understanding” of his 
position, cause him to be unable to “make any rational decisions regarding the defense.” United States v. Hemsi, 
901 F.2d 293, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1990).  See also Bryan v. Gibson, 276 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir. 2001) (aff’d in part 
and vacated in part by Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003)); Housh, 89 F. Supp.2d at 1229; State v. 
Haycock, 766 A.2d 720, 722 (N.H. 2001); Wilcoxson v. State, 22 S.W.3d 289, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Cf. 
Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000).
119 In re Heidnik, 112 F.3d 105, 111 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“Lafferty is in accord with our distinction 
between factual and rational understanding”).  The competence relevant to appointment of a next friend is a 
dominant frame through which the competence of severely depressed prisoners is measured.  Because the Rees v. 
Peyton test refers specifically to defects in a death-row inmate’s “premises,” 384 U.S. at 314, it is particularly likely 
that courts faced with a Rees challenge will focus on pre-reasoning defects in factual premises.  This point is 
explored further in Part II.B.1., infra.
120 112 F.3d at 109 & n.4.
121 Id. at 109.
122 Id. at 110.
123 Utah v. Mitchell, No. 031901884 (Third Judicial District Court, Memorandum of Judge Judith S. Atherton, dated 
July 26, 2005).
124 Two prominent forensic theorists, Jennifer Skeem and Stephen Golding, found Mitchell to be suffering from a 
delusional disorder that obviated adjudicative competence. See Mitchell, supra note 123, at  25, 32-33.  Much of 
their evaluations, and the court’s, centered on the difficult issue of distinguishing between a fixed delusional belief 
system and religious beliefs that, though unconventional, are properly regarded as non-delusional and even 
protected.  This same issue was presented in Lafferty, which also concerned a Utah defendant who had been 
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reality” was unduly impaired.125  The court therefore found him unable to make rational choices, 
which it equated with the “rational understanding” required by both Utah law and Dusky.126
Thus, as these cases demonstrate, severe defects in perception and understanding can impede a 
defendant’s ability to make decisions on his own behalf.
Defects in reasoning—the process by which one draws inferences and conclusions from 
premises127—also can defeat competence.  Flaws in logical reasoning are perhaps the most 
obvious and intuitive examples of irrationality; for example, were a defendant to understand (and 
believe) that all defense attorneys are their clients’ advocates, and that the person assigned to 
represent her is a defense attorney, and yet conclude that her defense attorney is the state’s 
advocate, we might well conclude that her logical reasoning powers are impaired.  Significantly, 
though, such defects seldom are reflected in the cases; instead, as the above cases demonstrate, at 
least with regard to psychotic defendants courts have found incompetence despite intact logical 
capacity.  This makes sense: while deductive reasoning is a necessary component for 
competence,128 it is far from sufficient, for such reasoning maps quite poorly onto real -world 
decision-making, in which the validity of premises matters and where decisional conditions are 
removed from the Church of Latter-Day Saints.   This issue, as well as that of defendants with potentially 
“delusional” political beliefs and motivations, warrants a far more careful explication than is possible here.
125 Mitchell, supra note 123, at 58 (citing to Lafferty). The court continued:  “Since having the capacity to 
realistically determine what is in one’s own best interest is nothing more or less than having the ability to make 
reasoned, rational choices, it follows from the court’s conclusion that because Defendant’s religious belief system is 
the basis upon which he makes decisions concerning his criminal case, he also lacks the capacity to consult with 
counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and is … incompetent to stand trial.”  Id.
126 Utah law, while largely parroting Dusky, also spells out in more detail the precise abilities subsumed under the 
general standard, and in those sections it articulates that a defendant must be able to “engage in reasoned choice of 
legal strategies and options.”  UTAH CODE ANN. §77-15-5(4)(a)(i)-(vii) (2005).  The Mitchell court reasoned that 
because Godinez rejected any distinction between “reasoned choice” and “rational understanding,” the rational 
understanding standard incorporates the ability to make rational decisions about one’s criminal case. Mitchell, supra
note 123, at 5 n.2.  See Part I.A, supra.
127 See, e.g., Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 93, at 3.
128 Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 109 n.8 & 113 (to be competent one “must also be able to reason with some 
degree of intactness.  Reasoning allows one to put together the relevant information one has purely understood and, 
having assessed, has formed beliefs about.”). 
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often confusing and in flux.129 Flexible reasoning—which requires fluid intelligence, ability to 
use deductive and inductive reasoning as appropriate, and incorporation of background goals, 
knowledge, and learning—provides a more appropriate model for the reasoning process 
underlying the pragmatic, real-world decision-making faced by criminal defendants.130  Thus, 
though Lafferty’s reasoning was logical—his conclusions and decisions, such as a desire to 
discharge counsel and refrain from presenting an insanity defense, were consistent with his 
premises—the court found it dispositive that delusional beliefs irredeemably distorted his 
premises.131
The extent to which courts have identified competence-threatening defects in choice—
including the component steps of formulating a conclusion, expressing that conclusion, and 
taking action accordingly—is limited.  Choice warrants separate articulation,132 as it is possible 
that a defendant might display valid reasoning on the basis of sound premises and yet reach a 
129 Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Deductive Reasoning, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, 
supra note 93, at 169, 169, 175, 179, 181 (it “is no longer appropriate to equate performance on deductive reasoning 
tasks with rationality” or to assume that logic provides an appropriate normative account of everyday, real world 
reasoning”).
130 See Steven A. Sloman & David A. Lagnado, The Problem of Induction, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 95-97  (like deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning “concerns the 
logical relations that hold between statements irrespective of their truth or falsity.  In the case of inductive logic, 
however, these relations admit of varying strengths, a conditional probability measure reflecting the rational degree 
of belief that someone should have in a hypothesis given the available evidence.”); Keith J. Holyoak, Analogy, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 117, 118 (“fluid intelligence” is the 
ability to reason with novel information). 
131 Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1554-55 (“This court cannot accept as consistent with Dusky and its progeny a finding of 
competency made under the view that a defendant who is unable to accurately perceive reality due to a paranoid 
delusional system need only act consistently with his paranoid delusion to be considered competent to stand trial.”); 
see also In re Heidnik, 112 F.3d at 111 (Heidnik incompetent despite his “considerable intelligence and expressive 
powers”). These courts rejected as sufficient what Kahneman and Frederick describe as “coherence rationality,” or 
“the strict conception that requires the agent’s entire system of beliefs and preferences to be internally consistent and 
immune to the effects of framing and context.”  Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic 
Judgment, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 267, 277. 
132 Though heavily reliant on the prior stages, choice additionally requires “assessment of the value of an option or 
the probability that it will yield a certain payoff (judgment) coupled with choice among alternatives (decision 
making),” as well as “construction of a course of action that can achieve a goal.”  Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 
93, at 2.
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conflicting or somehow irrational conclusion,133 lack ability to communicate her choices,134 or be 
unable to act in accordance with her choices. For example, the record indicates that Lafferty 
may have had additional defects in this domain, as he had chosen to discharge counsel but was 
unable to take action implementing that choice.  For reasons that he apparently would not 
explain, Lafferty refused to put his expressed desire to represent himself on the record in the 
required form, with the result that counsel was not discharged.135
The Lafferty, In re Heidnik, and Mitchell decisions represent some of the only examples 
of an overt attempt by the courts to define rational understanding, let alone an attempt to do so 
by reference to an articulation of the affected stages of a rational decision-making process.  This 
approach is far from uncontroversial.  The dissenting judge in Lafferty, for example, took strong 
issue with what he saw as the majority’s misguided “quest to articulate the one true legal 
definition of competency.”136 Such criticism, though, is overcome by the significant advantages 
of a transparent and finely-grained approach.  In the case of psychosis incorporating delusional 
perception and understanding, one clear benefit of locating the site of dysfunction and teasing 
out its effect is avoidance of, on the one hand, overinclusion attending simplistic equation of 
133 For example, a defendant who believes that she will be punished by God for escaping a jail term might conclude 
that it is in her best interest to reject a plea offer, despite her ability to reason through why the offer is otherwise in 
her best interest.  The belief is a factor that intervenes between the preliminary conclusion (it is good to take the 
offer) and the ultimate conclusion (it is bad to take the offer).  Clearly, these stages of judgment and decision-
making overlap heavily.  See, e.g., Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 93, at 3.
134 For example, because of his communication deficits Theon Jackson would not have been able to express a choice 
as to the course of his defense even had he the ability to arrive at one.  See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 718-19.
135 See 949 F.2d at 1549.
136 Id. at 1557-58 (Brorby, J., dissenting). In the dissent’s view, the finding of competence was adequately grounded 
in record evidence of Lafferty’s intellectual functioning and the prosecution’s expert testimony offering “a generally 
functional view of rationality centering on whether a person can piece things together, see relationship between 
incidents, remember information, and thereby factually and theoretically assist in his defense.”  Id. at 1566. Cf.
Kansas v. Barnes, 948 P.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. Kan. 1997) (expert reports of defendant’s delusions and paranoia 
overcome by evidence that he “had comprehension of the roles of the various participants in the trial,” understood 
the charges and possible consequences, and “was able to respond appropriately in court and cooperate with his 
attorney”).
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psychosis with incompetence137 and, on the other, underinclusion attending simplistic reliance on 
logic as the sine qua non of competence.138 But the methodological benefits go even further, as 
thought-content disorders are not the only sort to warrant such an articulation; these may just be 
the easiest cases.  A defendant like Mitchell may be relatively easy to identify should he choose 
to verbalize his beliefs, delusional by any objective standard.  Certainly other, possibly less 
obvious, disorders might have equivalent impact.  These cases therefore are valuable also 
because they model an approach that can be applied to other disorders, including—as the next 
Part proposes—emotional disorders.
As this Part has shown, then, a model of human decision-making—even a basic one such 
as that offered here—incorporates a number of complex underlying concepts, each of which 
represents a site of potentially competence-threatening “irrationality.”139  In the case of 
psychosis, the most endangered sites appear to be perception and understanding, though defects 
at that stage also will frustrate flexible reasoning and potentially destabilize choice.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, then, despite controversy over methodology, the conclusion that severe impairment 
to a defendant’s cognitive processes—particularly that associated with thought-content 
137 Consider the following “telling colloquy”: “Judge: Doctor, is he incompetent?  Psychiatrist: Judge, he is 
psychotic!”  Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 92 & n. 109; see also John Monahan, Foreword, in ROESCH & 
GOLDING, supra note 6, at v (noting “the inadequacy of the psychiatrist’s answer” and “the inefficacy of the judge’s 
question”). For example, were a psychotic defendant’s delusional thinking limited to the belief that she is actually a 
Russian princess, such belief may or may not have any effect on ability to protect her interests in a criminal 
proceeding, particularly if her notions as to the relevant facts and law comport closely to those relevant to one who 
is not a Russian princess.  Similarly, were her psychosis limited to occasional auditory hallucinations that did not 
touch on the subject matter of the trial or cause her to become confused, distracted, or inappropriate in conversations 
with her attorney or during trial, they may not threaten competence.
138 See, e.g., Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1557-58 (Brorby, J., dissenting); see also Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 
404 (5th Cir. 1985) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
139 Of course, many irrational and nonrational processes, such as reliance on common heuristics and biases, might 
threaten normative “rationality” in an important sense and yet not signal incompetence.  See Part III, infra.
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disorder—can defeat the presumption of competence is reflected in a number of cases.140  It also 
has been urged by scholars writing in the area of competence to consent to medical treatment.141
Largely missing from this traditional account of decision-making and its relevance to 
adjudicative competence, however, is the influence of emotion.  Defendants with profound 
impairments of emotional perception, processing, and expression may be equally impaired in 
ability to make self-interested rational decisions, although they may appear to be in touch with 
reality in a way that psychotic persons often do not. That is the subject of the following Part.
II. Emotional Competence and Rational Understanding
As the preceding Part explained, the key to Dusky rational understanding is whether a 
criminal defendant is capable of making defendant-driven decisions—such as whether to plead 
guilty, discharge counsel, raise an insanity defense, present mitigating evidence, and challenge or 
acquiesce to her conviction and sentence—with recourse to at least minimally intact rational 
decision-making processes.  Such a determination requires a highly particularized inquiry into 
whether the defendant’s perception and understanding of relevant aspects of the world are 
accurate; whether she is able to engage in appropriately flexible reasoning; and whether she can 
formulate, express, maintain, and implement choices.  Such a determination should be made in 
light of the specific demands of the criminal case, with an eye always toward whether the 
defendant’s decision-making capacities permit her to hold up her end of a highly adversarial 
140 See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney, C.J., dissenting); Strickland v. Francis, 
738 F.2d 1542, 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Strickland was out of touch with reality and totally incapable of 
assisting in his defense”; he “suffered from delusional characteristics and had psychotic disorders that made it 
difficult for him to deal with reality”); Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1063 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant’s 
schizophrenia “caused him to misperceive important elements of the proceedings”).
141 See Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 116-17, 119, 123 (“Accurate beliefs about the world are essential to 
competency, because decisions take effect in the world. … we propose … a ‘patently false delusional belief’ 
standard.  Patently false delusional beliefs are ones that are grossly improbable” because they “violate the laws of 
nature,” are “practically impossible,” or represent “a gross distortion of obvious facts”; “[r]eligious and cultural 
beliefs are exempted” from this purview.”); Bonnie, supra note 18, at 573-74 (“delusional” defendants who make 
“irrational” decisions are decisionally incompetent because their reasons lack “a plausible grounding in reality”).  
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proceeding.  Before the defendant is found incompetent on the basis of a flaw at any decision-
making juncture, an examiner or court should be able to articulate the origin of that fault and 
explain how it is thought to disrupt rationality.
All evidence suggests that no such approach is being implemented.  Because judicial 
determinations almost always rest entirely on the recommendation of experts, and because those 
experts generally do not explain either their methodology or the basis for their conclusions, it is 
very difficult to know what underlies most adjudicative competence decisions.142 But to the 
extent that examiners and courts sometimes reveal their conception of the distinction between a 
“rational” and “factual” understanding, it appears clear that the generally operative concept of
Dusky rationality is focused almost entirely on disordered cognitive processes, such as those seen 
in thought disorder.  The role of emotional disorder, though sometimes mentioned, remains 
almost entirely unexplored.143  Indeed, it is sometimes deliberately disregarded.
This Part, then, seeks to articulate, with reference to the decision-making model 
presented in Part I, the theoretical underpinnings of an adjudicative competence standard that 
incorporates a sophisticated understanding of emotion.  The two examples it explores, depression 
and brain damage, represent two situations in which severe emotional dysfunction might disrupt 
the rational decision-making capacity demanded by Dusky but to which a purely cognitive 
approach is particularly ill-suited.
142 See, e.g., GRISSO, supra note 13, at 79 (“Little is known empirically about the methods that clinicians actually 
use in collecting data for competence to stand trial determinations.”).
143 Like the distinction between cognition and emotion, see pp. 35-36 infra, that between a thought disorder and an 
emotional disorder is overly simplified.  Many mental illnesses in which thought disorder plays a prominent role—
for example, schizophrenia—commonly also have affective elements, such as blunted affect.  See DSM-IV-TR, 
supra note 100, at 299.  Similarly, affective disorders—such as clinical depression—commonly entail cognitive 
deficits.  See id. at 349.  But these distinctions between and among disorders reflect that certain dysfunctions are 
more about one than the other, which is part of how they are clinically distinguished. 
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A. The Role of Emotion in Decision-Making
Emotion is implicated in decision-making processes at many, or perhaps all, of the 
junctures described in the previous Part.144  Its role, however, historically has been both 
underexplored and undervalued.145  As a result, emotion is more poorly understood than are the 
various cognitive mechanisms underlying human decision-making.  Fortunately, this situation is 
changing rapidly.146  But despite these advances, no concerted effort has been made to tie 
contemporary emotion research into the formulation of competence-relevant decision-making.147
Because of emotion’s importance, such an effort is vital.
144 See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 91, 
93 (Michael Lewis & Jeanette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2d ed. 2000) (emotion’s function is “to direct the activities 
and interactions of the subprograms governing perception; attention; inference; learning; memory; goal choice; 
motivational priorities; categorization and conceptual frameworks; physiological reactions …; reflexes; behavioral 
decision rules; motor systems; communication processes; energy level and effort allocation; affective coloration of 
events and stimuli; recalibration of probability estimates, situation assessments, values, and regulatory variables … 
and so on.”); Nicole A. Roberts et al., The impact of orbital prefrontal cortex damage on emotional activation to 
unanticipated and anticipated acoustic startle stimuli, 4 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 307, 
316 (2004) (“deviations in emotional response” in certain brain-damaged patients “can be expected to have an 
adverse impact on such cognitive processes as attention, learning, memory, and decision making, all of which are 
profoundly influenced by emotional reactions”).
145 Ola Svenson, Values, Affect, and Processes in Human Decision Making: A Differentiation and Consolidation 
Theory Perspective, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING RESEARCH, supra note 94, 
at 287, 296  (“[T]he very strong emphasis on cognitive functions in decision research during the past few decades 
has led to neglect of the roles of affect, emotional involvement, and affective components in decision processes.”); 
Melissa L. Finucane et al., Judgment and Decision Making: The Dance of Affect and Reason, in EMERGING 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH, supra note 94, at 327, 329 (“Affect has … rarely been 
recognized as an important component in research and theory in judgment and decision making.”); Alice M. Isen & 
Aparna A. Labroo, Some Ways in Which Positive Affect Facilitates Decision Making and Judgment, in EMERGING 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH, supra note 94, at 365, 367  (“the field of decision making 
has been slow to incorporate research on affect”).
146 See Svenson, supra note 145, at 289 (“decision researchers are becoming increasingly interested in the effects of 
emotion and affect on human decision processes”); Isen & Labroo, supra note 145, at 366.  An overview of the 
study of emotion is beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 144.  For 
developments within psychology, see EMOTIONS: ESSAYS ON EMOTION THEORY (Stephanie H.M. van Goozen et al. 
eds., 1994); RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION (1991); ANDREW ORTONY ET AL., THE COGNITIVE 
STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS (1988); APPROACHES TO EMOTION (Klaus R. Scherer & Paul Ekman eds., 1984); 1 
THEORIES OF EMOTION: EMOTION, THEORY, RESEARCH, AND EXPERIENCE (Robert Plutchik & Henry Kellerman 
eds., 1980); in the neural sciences, see HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003);
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMOTION (Richard D. Lane & Lynn Nadel eds., 2000); ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE 
FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1999); LEDOUX, supra note 
1; ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994). 
147 The one instance in which such a connection has been urged is within a small debate in the area of capacity to 
consent to medical treatment.  See Charland, supra note 85; Louis C. Charland, Is. Mr. Spock Mentally Competent? 
Competence to Consent and Emotion, 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 67 (1998); Ruth Chadwick, 
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The first task is to define emotion, which is used here as an umbrella term encompassing 
the concepts of emotion, feelings, mood, and affect.148  Theorists generally agree on the 
existence of certain “core” emotions—including fear, anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, and 
disgust—a repertoire on which humans demonstrate many variations.149  “Affect” refers to the 
positive or negative quality of a feeling-state, but is used also to describe the manner in which a 
person externalizes feeling-states—for example, one whose facial expressions appear to display 
no emotion is said to have a “flat affect.”150  “Mood” refers to feeling-states—such as anxiety 
and depression—that are “more transient, diffuse, and less attributable to particular sources” than 
emotions.151
Fundamentally, each of these aspects of emotion is thought to be in important respects 
both separate and separable from “cognition,”152 which refers generally to intellectual or 
“thinking” processes (including many that operate below the level of consciousness) not 
Commentary on “Is Mr. Spock Mentally Competent?,” 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 83 (1998); Carl 
Elliot; Commentary on “Is Mr. Spock Mentally Competent?,” 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 87 (1998); 
Stuart J. Younger, Commentary on “Is Mr. Spock Mentally Competent?,” 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL.
89 (1998); Louis C. Charland, Response to the Commentaries, 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 93 (1998); 
see also Part III, infra.
148 See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, __ LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. __, __ & n.36 (forthcoming 2006) (using similar definition).  For a treatment of definitional debates within 
emotion theory, see generally THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 3, 51 (Paul Ekman & Richard 
J. Davidson eds., 1994).
149 However, multiple taxonomies of the emotions have been offered, with very different lineups.  See, e.g., ROBERT 
PLUTCHIK, EMOTION: A PSYCHOEVOLUTIONARY THESIS (1980) (eight basic emotions); James A. Russell, A 
Circumplex Model of Affect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1161 (1980) (four).  
150 See, e.g., THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 49-96, 184, 199; Paul Slovic, What’s Fear Got to Do with 
It?  It’s Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 MO. L. REV. 971, 971, 989 (2004); Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 
328.  Affect is sometimes also used in the global sense here proposed for “emotion.”  See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, 
Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An Empirical Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. 
REV. 1 (2005).
151 See Blumenthal, supra note 150, at 3; Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 328; Richard J. Davidson, On Emotion, 
Mood, and Related Affective Concepts, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 51.
152 See, e.g., Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional Foundations of Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1151, 1153 (2005) (“If cognition is about tr uth and falsity and is concerned with categorization, then emotion 
is about goodness and badness and is concerned with evaluation.”); Carroll E. Izard, Cognition Is One of Four Types 
of Emotion-Activating Systems, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 203, 204 (“Emotion is about 
motivation, cognition about knowledge.”); Daniel M.T. Fessler et al., Angry men and disgusted women: An 
evolutionary approach to the influence of emotions on risk taking, 95 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 107,118 (2004) (“emotions constitute a relatively autonomous channel of influence on decision making, 
operating in conjunction with, but largely independent of, more strictly cognitive processes”).
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necessarily imbued with emotional content.153  In recent years most emotion theorists have come 
to agree that this dividing line is anything but sharp,154 and that many, perhaps all, emotions have 
cognitive aspects.155  Nonetheless, the two realms are still helpfully conceptualized separately, 
even as we gain a more sophisticated understanding of their interrelatedness.156  Referring to 
cognition and emotion as separate—as thinking and feeling—remains so common in both 
scientific and colloquial conversation that it retains communicative value.  Moreover, as 
discussed below, emotion has unique influences that cannot be accounted for, either theoretically 
or practically, with cognitive tests.
Historically, to the very limited extent that emotion has been considered within decision-
making theory it has been regarded solely as a distorting factor whose presence disrupts 
rationality.157  This disparaging attitude has been particularly influential within law, in which 
153 See, e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 98 (“cognitive” abilities consist of “a particular subset of 
information-processing—roughly, the effortful, conscious, voluntary, deliberative kind of thinking one does when 
solving a mathematics problem or paying chess”); Pheobe C. Ellsworth, Levels of Thought and Levels of Emotion, in 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 192, 193 (cognition defined as “sensory information processing,” 
“conscious propositional analysis,” or both); Joseph E. LeDoux, Cognitive-Emotional Interactions in the Brain, in 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 216 (cognition “is nothing more than a word we use to describe a 
group of related but diverse information-processing functions, including sensory processing, perception, imagery, 
attention, memory, reasoning, and problem-solving”).
154 See Van Goozen et al, supra note 146, at viii (“One of the liveliest debates in the field of emotions is the relation 
between affect and cognition.  Some hold that affect determines cognition, others that cognition determines affect.”); 
Jeffrey A. Gray, Framework for a Taxonomy of Psychiatric Disorder, in EMOTIONS: ESSAYS IN EMOTION THEORY, 
supra note 118, at 29, 30 (there is no brain structure “implicated in the control of emotional behavior that has not 
been implicated also in a variety of perceptual, cognitive, and motor functions”); but see Robert B. Zajonc, 
Emotional Expression and Temperature Modulation, in EMOTIONS: ESSAYS IN EMOTION THEORY, supra note 118, at 
3, 22-23.
155 See, e.g., THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 179-234; Andrew Ortony et al., THE COGNITIVE 
STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS (1988); Jennifer S. Beer et al., Frontal Lobe Contributions to Executive Control of 
Cognitive and Social Behavior, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III 1091, 1095, 1101 (Michael S. Gazzaniga et 
al. eds., 2004).  One sense in which this is thought to be so is that emotions are “about” objects in the world.  See, 
e.g., Clore, supra note 152, at 1159; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF 
EMOTIONS (2001).
156 See LeDoux, supra note 153, at 220-23 (“Knowing these differences sets the stage for examining the links 
between the systems.”).
157 See Clore, supra note 152, at 101 (“A long tradition, stretching from classical philosophy to the present, views 
passion as the enemy or reason.”); LAZARUS, supra note 118, at 17 (“In the 1950s and 1960s, psychologists were 
very interested in the ways in which strong emotions could interfere with rational problem solving and thought.”); 
Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and Negotiation, 10 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 234 (2005); Bruce E. Kaufman, Emotional arousal as a source of bounded rationality, 38 J. 
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passion traditionally is cast as the enemy of reason.158 Certain aspects of emotional experience 
unquestionably can distort rational decision-making; scholars have largely legitimated the folk 
wisdom, reflected in numerous areas of legal doctrine, that emotion can be a powerful and 
sometimes disruptive force.159 However, recent developments in emotion theory have made 
clear that emotion also can play a positive role.160  Indeed, in recent years a number of legal 
theorists have drawn on emotion theory to assert that “emotion in concert with cognition leads to 
truer perception and, ultimately to better (more accurate, more moral, more just) decisions.”161
Negative and positive perspectives—both grounded fundamentally in the realization that emotion 
cannot be eliminated but instead should be better understood—are equally important to an 
examination of emotion’s influence on competence-relevant decision-making.162
Returning to the model of decision-making presented in the preceding Part, emotion has 
essentially two types of influence.163  First, emotion represents an important mechanism for the 
perception and processing of information, one that captures different information than would 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 135, 139 (1999); Charland, supra note 85, at 359 (“It is generally agreed that emotions can 
influence mental competence negatively.  This occurs when they disrupt and impede the cognitive capacities that are 
held to underlie competence.”); Isen & Labroo, supra note 145, at 366 (traditionally “affect was considered as an 
‘interrupt’ or disruption in an otherwise goal-directed program”); see also id. at 382 (citing recent work that, while 
claiming at one point to be “consistent with a view of emotion as beneficial to be person and adaptive,” appears to 
assume that intense, negative emotion “derails or overrides thinking and good judgment, and causes people to make 
errors, take inappropriate actions, or fail to speak and think clearly”).
158 See Maroney, supra note 148, at ___ & nn. xx-xx (“A core presumption underlying modern legality is that reason 
and emotion are different beasts entirely; they belong to separate spheres of human existence; the sphere of law 
admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep emotion from creeping in where it does not 
belong.”).
159 Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 107 (certain events trigger “emotion programs in which the desire to 
attempt certain actions should be overwhelming, to the point where the actions are perceived as compulsory,” and 
that phenomenon receives cultural recognition in the law of “crimes of passion”).
160 See Van Goozen et al., supra note 146, at x (contemporary “emotion theory views emotional impulses as in some 
way adaptive and rational”); Charland, supra note 85, at 359 (“in addition to their negative role, emotions also have 
a positive role to play in competence”).
161 Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 7, 11 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); see also Samuel 
H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989)
(critiquing the “myth of dispassion,” which “rests on two fictions: (1) that emotion necessarily leads to injustice, and 
(2) that a just decisionmaker is necessarily a dispassionate one”).
162 See, e.g., Isen & Labroo, supra note 145, at 367 (the “realization that affect is a regular part of thought processes 
and motivation or processing goals” prompts more “realistic and complex” science).
163 See Svenson, supra note 145, at 297 (emotion’s influence may be procedural or representational); Fessler et al., 
supra note 152, at 108.
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cognition alone.164  Second, emotion affects the perceived value, personal relevance, or 
attractiveness of the information being processed, and therefore will shape motivation and 
goals.165  These influences can be seen at each stage of decision-making.
First, emotion can influence both which stimuli are perceived and how they are 
perceived.166  This is first seen through the mechanism of attention.  Because emotionally salient 
stimuli tend to be the ones of greatest significance to one’s thriving, they will be attended to 
disproportionately.167 Thus, one without recourse to emotion’s guidance will find herself largely 
unable to sort effectively among the nearly infinite competitors for her attention.  Once a 
stimulus is attended to, emotion continues to have an influence.  For example, a fearful person 
might believe that the shadow of a tree is that of a man wielding a knife, where others would not 
perceive such an aggression.168  In such a case, while the common tendency is to describe the 
distortion as residing in what the person “thought she saw,” it may also reside one stage earlier: 
the emotion has shaped both “what she saw” and what she “thought she saw.”  Extremes of 
emotion may also influence perceptual recall.  In acute cases of trauma, for instance, persons 
might become unable to recall the emotionally powerful incident, or instead may recall it so 
164 See Ryan, supra note 157, at 232 (“without the information gleaned from the emotional sense that imbues human 
interaction and institutions with meaning, our world would seem reduced to hollow shells and randomly-acting 
forms”).
165 See, e.g., Clore, supra note 152, at 1164 (“affect serves as information” and “provides information about value”); 
Robert Nozick, Emotions, in THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 87, 93 & n.*, 96-97 (1990)
(emotions provide a “picture of value,” as a type of “analog recording to language’s digital picture of events,” and 
thus represents a different way of knowing); Svenson, supra note 145, at 292 (emotion and affect contribute to 
evaluations of attractiveness of alternatives).  
166 See Gray, supra note 154, at 30 (“[a]t the level of perception, the detection and interpretation of stimuli are 
known to be deeply influenced by emotional state”); Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 341 (“mental representations 
of the decision stimuli provoke on-line affective experiences that influence people’s perceptions and consequently 
their judgments and decisions”).
167 See, e.g., Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 347 (“much research by social, clinical, and physiological 
psychologists demonstrates that mood and emotion can direct attention toward or away from particular features in 
the environment”).
168 See, e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 104; Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 341.
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vividly and frequently that other information is kept out of accessible memory.169  Thus, the 
emotional salience of stimuli can substantially affect attention to, as well as perception and 
memory of, both those stimuli and emotionally nonsalient stimuli.
Emotion also has a strong influence at the understanding stage.  Different emotional 
states are associated with distinct information-processing modes;170 for example, studies have 
suggested that persons in whom a “sad mood” has been evoked process information more slowly 
but possibly more accurately than “neutrals,” while those in a “happy mood” tend to process 
information more quickly but with a lower level of accuracy.171  But from the perspective of 
competence assessment, perhaps the most significant contribution of emotion to this stage of 
decision-making is through “appraisal” and “appreciation.”  Intimately tied to emotional 
salience, appraisal and appreciation are interdependent aspects of understanding that concern 
awareness of personal significance.  Appraisal describes a “lighting-fast” judgment as to whether 
and how particular stimuli matter to one’s well-being and goals,172 a judgment that will then 
shape information processing.173  Intact appraisal leads to emotional reactions to personally 
169 See Lazarus, supra note 118, at 17 (“When a person is in a traumatic situation, perception and thought may be 
impaired, blocked, distracted, even paralyzed.”); Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 111 (describing 
phenomenon among rape victims of experiencing prolonged period of time in which images of attack dominate).
170 Because this area of research is one of overlap between thinking and reasoning, it is discussed primarily under the 
rubric of the latter.  
171 See Daniel C. Molden & E. Tory Higgins, Motivated Thinking, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING 
AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 295, 311; Svenson, supra note 145, at 297; DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, 
supra note 146, at 147, 163-64.  But see note 152, infra (discussing contrary assertions by Isen & Labroo).
172 Clore, supra note 152, at 104 (“such evaluations are core features of the resulting emotions”); see also LAZARUS, 
supra note 118, at 151-52 (“Very rapidly, perhaps even simultaneously, we draw on a variety of stored information 
about the environment, person variables, and their relational meaning. How this is done remains something of a 
mystery, but we must indeed automatically do something similar to what I have described, or else the emotion 
process would not be adaptive and our emotional lives would be much more chaotic than they are.”).
173 LAZARUS, supra note 118, at 144, 145, 149-51 (“Although knowledge is the cold cognitive stuff of which 
personal meaning is made, it is not an appraisal with its personal heat until the implications for personal well-being 
have been drawn.” ); Fessler et al., supra note 152, at 117; Clore, supra note 152, at 104 (“[W]e arrive at the 
emotional significance of events, actions, and objects through some sort of cognitive appraisal process.”).
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relevant stimuli.174  Such appraisal and the attending emotion then contribute heavily to the 
specific understanding, or appreciation, that information presented to (and decisions required of) 
a person are applicable to her and carry consequences for her personal situation.175   For example, 
a defendant may understand that the death penalty is a potential consequence of her prosecution.  
To say that she cannot appreciate that fact would mean that she literally does not think it applies 
to her—for example, because she believes that she is immortal—or that she realizes that it 
applies, but does not attach to that realization any emotional significance.  Without appreciation
a defendant lacks Dusky “rational understanding.”176  This is largely because a person without 
appreciation does not have access to the fear, hope, or other emotional reactions to relevant 
information that normally would guide personally consequential decision-making.177
Reasoning also will be influenced by emotion states.  For example, one exposed to a 
negative feeling (e.g., fear evoked by recalling the sighting of a snake) generally will report an 
increased (and likely inaccurate) estimation of the likelihood of future occurrence of events that, 
though completely unrelated, may provoke the same negative feeling (e.g., a terrorist attack).178
That reasoning process likely would be quite different were the subject to have entered the 
174 See Izard, supra note 124, at 206; Goldstein & Hogarth, supra note 107, at 9; LeDoux, supra note 153, at 291; 
Gray, supra note 154, at 30 (“at the cognitive level, it is widely accepted that appraisal of a stimulus (e.g., as threat 
or promise) plays a vital role in the initiation of the appropriate emotional state”).
175 Charland, supra note 85, at 362; Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 336; POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 63-
64 “(Unlike understanding, which reflects comprehension at a more general and abstract level (i.e., how the legal 
system is supposed to work), appreciation relates to a defendant’s beliefs about how legal actors and processes will 
play out in his or her own case.”). But see Appelbaum, supra note 33 (“Since appreciation and appraisal rest on 
similar cognitive abilities, it is probably not correct to say that one requires the other, so much as to say that 
impairment of one function is likely to be accompanied by impairment of the other.”).
176 POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 63-64.  In the first iteration of failed appreciation, where the defendant 
believes she is immortal, the competence defect is caused by delusional thinking, a manifestation of thought 
disorder.  See Part I.C., supra.  It is to this form of appreciation, not the affective element, to which the MacArthur 
researchers primarily direct their inquiry.  See n. 293, infra. 
177 See Charland, supra note 85, at 362-63, 370.  In the thought-disorder iteration, the effect on emotion is 
secondary: the delusional thought prevents access to the emotional reaction that would obtain were the cognitive 
assessment accurate.  In the second iteration, the effect is primary: the person lacks ability to generate the emotional 
response at all, even given an accurate cognitive trigger.
178 See, e.g., Fessler et al., supra note 152, at 108 (discussing Johnson and Tversky’s “affective generalization
hypothesis”).
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probabilistic exercise with a different affective prior.  However, the mechanisms by which 
emotion influences reasoning remain contested.  Research has suggested, for example, that 
persons in a positive mood disproportionately draw inferences consistent with maintenance of 
positive mood.179  Other researchers, however, argue that positive affect can be shown to make 
reasoning “more efficient and more thorough, as long as the task is one that is meaningful, 
interesting, or important to the decision maker.”180  To simplify a complex area, emotion’s 
influence on reasoning is highly contextual.
Finally, emotion can profoundly influence choice, including its communication and 
implementation.  The person described above, inordinately fearful of terrorist attack, might make 
specific choices (e.g., engaging in increased risk avoidance) on the basis of her affectively driven 
reasoning.  Emotion-driven choice can also be far more primal.  Feeling- states predispose the 
actor to particular behavioral responses—anger, for example, is highly associated with risk-
taking behavior and aggression, fear with risk avoidance and escape, and disgust with avoidance 
and withdrawal.181  Some emotional experiences—notably fear—appear to be nearly automatic 
responses to certain types of stimuli, with the result that they (and the outward behaviors with 
which they are associated, such as freezing, running, or striking out) are experienced as 
involuntary, or at least very difficult to override cognitively.182  It also has been suggested that 
179 See, e.g., Robyn A. LeBouef & Eldar B. Shafir, Decision Making, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING 
AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 243, 258; Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 333.  But see Fessler et al., supra
note 152, at 108 (discussing contrary evidence).
180 Isen & Labroo, supra note 145, at 377, 383, 387 (“there is now growing evidence that positive affect promotes 
both efficient and thorough problem solving and generally enhances cognitive ability and processes”; “positive 
affect has a substantial facilitating impact on organization of thought, cognitive flexibility and elaboration, 
evaluation of evidence, negotiation tactics and responsiveness, variety-seeking and risk-taking propensities, and the 
efficiency and thoroughness of decision strategies”).
181 See, e.g., Fessler et al., supra note 152, at 109-110 (drawing on the work of, inter alia, Fridja and Lazarus); see 
also Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 107 (“Specific acts and courses of action will be more available as 
responses in some states than in others, and more likely to be implemented.”); Gray, supra note 154, at 30.
182 LE DOUX, supra note 1; see also Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Intact performance on an indirect measure of race 
bias following amygdala damage, 41 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 203, 203-04 (2003) (fear responses of the amygdala are 
“automatic and not dependent on conscious, control processes”).   
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extreme emotional instability causes inability to maintain a consistent choice preference.183
Ability to communicate a choice may also be impaired—for example, a person who firmly
wishes to obtain a divorce may feel unable to say so (and be thus frustrated in realizing his goal) 
because of intense fear of public exposure to shame for having failed in his marriage.
As the above discussion reveals, a very significant movement within the mind sciences—
one that is increasingly reflected in legal theory184—asserts that, not only is emotion not the 
natural enemy of rationality,185 it is intimately connected to the perception and processing of 
information, appraisal of value, formation of goals, motivation of behavior, and implementation 
of choice.186  Emotion can be a strong force contributing to rational thought by marking 
particular stimuli as meaningful and generating a sense of personal relevance and value that will 
shape goals and motivations.  Thus, a lack of emotion where one normally would expect it to be 
present can deprive the decision-maker of vital information and guidance.  Emotion can also be 
disruptive, in that it may derail optimal perception, understanding, reasoning, and 
communication, or may override one’s otherwise preferred choices.  While emotion and 
cognition are deeply intertwined, the influence of the former cannot always be seen or accounted 
for by reference only to the latter.
183 See LeBouef & Shafir, supra note 179, at 258; Svenson, supra note 145, at 316.
184 See Maroney, supra note 148, at __.
185 See Clore, supra note 152, at 102 (emotions are both operational tools that contribute to rationality and feedback 
mechanisms that “tell us whether we have chosen rationally”); Slovic, supra note 122, at 990 (emotion and the 
“affect heuristic” enable us “to be rational actors in many important situations.  But not in all situations.  It works 
beautifully in some circumstances and fails miserably in others.  The law must learn to tell the difference.”); Ryan, 
supra note 157, at 249 (“[D]ecision-makers may be unduly swayed by inadequately considered emotional responses 
as often as their decisions may fail to take proper account of emotionally-informed wisdom.  But fear of the former 
has driven the work of all emotionality underground in legal arenas, where it continues to influence deliberation 
beyond recognition or redress.”); DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 246.
186 See, e.g., Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 343 (an “affect heuristic” guides decisions, particularly “when the 
required judgment is complex or mental resources are limited,” and may serve as “a necessary bridge across the 
unexpected and the unknown.  It facilitates information integration in judgments and decisions, guides reason, and 
gives priorities among multiple goals,” in addition to “being a powerful motivator of behavior”).  
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A complete account of the decisional competence component of Dusky rationality 
therefore demands close attention to the positive and negative contributions of both cognition 
and emotion.187  Because adjudicative competence is concerned with radical departures from 
minimal norms of rational decision-making, we must think carefully about the sorts of emotional 
dysfunction that might take a defendant so far outside these norms as to be declared unfit to 
determine her own fate within a criminal proceeding.  That is the project of the following 
Section.
B. Emotional Disorder and Rational Decision-Making
We previously have explored the intimate relationship between cognition and emotion in 
human decision-making, and in the preceding Part we saw how some courts have begun to 
delineate how certain defects in cognitive processes might undermine adjudicative competence.  
A similar effort is possible with regard to emotional dysfunction.  However, no such effort has 
been undertaken to date.
This is not to say that emotion is never discussed at all in connection with adjudicative 
competence.  Indeed, the caselaw occasionally surrenders small hints that emotion is considered 
at least marginally relevant.188 Milton Dusky, for example, apparently experienced “emotional 
turmoil,” as well as “depression, feelings of inadequacy and unworthiness,” and Richard Allen 
Moran was described as depressed and wracked by remorse and guilt.189  The significance of 
these emotional and mood states was never explained, but for they were some reason considered 
187 See Svenson, supra note 145, at 321 (consideration of affect “opens possibilities for a deeper understanding of 
decision processes”).
188 In one reported case a court found a defendant incompetent to stand trial because “he did not emotionally 
appreciate his peril sufficiently to assist his legal counsel in defense of the charge filed against him,” though the 
higher court later overturned that ruling after finding that the defendant was in remission and his unusual emotional 
expression and inappropriate affect could be explained to the jury.  State v. Gwaltney, 468 P.2d 433, 433 (Wash. 
1970) (defendant “was afflicted with the emotional disease of schizophrenia”).
189 Dusky, 271 F.2d at, 387-88, 391; Godinez, 509 U.S. at 410; see also Bonnie, supra note 18, at 587 (discussion of 
Moran’s depression and remorse). See also Drope, 420 U.S. at 165 (James Drope was severely depressed).
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worthy of mention.190  Similarly, commentators and forensic theorists sometimes, in passing,
mention emotion-states as a potentially relevant consideration.191 One (now quite outdated and 
likely seldom used) standardized forensic assessment instrument incorporated a direct measure 
of a defendant’s “ability to deal emotionally with the criminal process.”192
However, while it seems that from time to time scholars, examiners, and courts regard 
emotion as somehow relevant to adjudicative competence, there is no operative theory as to why 
or how this is so.193  There certainly are few indications that emotion is thought to be relevant 
because its intact functioning is critical to rational decision-making.  Indeed, given the very long 
history of rationality being explicitly opposed to emotion and the extremely recent genesis of 
research and scholarship challenging that opposition,194 there is every reason to believe that 
when courts, examiners, and commentators have spoken of rational understanding they have 
190 See also Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542, 1549 & nn.12, 14 (11th Cir. 1984) (psychiatrist’s explanation of 
how anxiety affects rational thought processes and  relevance of emotional content of examinee’s speech); 
Wilcoxson v. State, 22 S.W.3d 289, 307-08 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (defendant “has been diseased emotionally and 
socially all of his life, is “[e]motionally immature” and “emotional[ly] labile,”  and has “elevated affect,” “affective 
illness,” “depression,”  “mood swings”) Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 665 (9th Cir. 1972) (defendant had 
mood swings and “deep-seated emotional problems of long duration”); GRISSO, supra note 13, at 195.  
191 See, e.g., Viljoen et al., supra note 168, at 24 (“Within Canadian law, a broad number of mental disorders can be 
used as bases for finding a defendant unfit, such as psychotic, affective, cognitive, personality, and substance abuse 
disorders.”); Bonnie, supra note 18, at 573 (“Problems in appreciating the situation and its consequences may arise 
due to limitations in cognitive capacity, to disturbances of thought, or to affective disorders.”); Burt & Morris, supra
note 11, at 92 (society should “provide treatment opportunities to any defendant whose emotional stability and 
consequent trial competency could be improved”); ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 6-7 (“The issue of 
competency raises a series of important theoretical and pragmatic questions regarding the nature of cognitive and 
emotional capacities required by a defendant in order to be treated fairly.”); GRISSO, supra note 13, at 86 
(“Psychological characteristics that may be relevant for developing … causal connections” between impaired 
competence and etiology “include general intelligence, memory, contact with reality, motivation, reasoning or 
problem solving, and emotional control.”).  
192 GRISSO, supra note 13, at 132 (assessing the 1973 Competence Screening Test (CST)).  As Grisso noted, there 
was an “imperfect correspondence between the measurement constructs and legal criteria,” as the CST judged 
“understanding of the consequences of the proceedings” with a measure of “ability to deal emotionally. … Thus the 
legal construct is cognitive, whereas the measurement construct refers to an affective component.”  Id. at 133.  
However, Grisso mused that measures of affective and coping skills could relate to any of the Dusky components.  
See id.
193 Cf. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 912-14 (7th ed. 2001) (citing cases on psychopaths and “affective insanity,” including United States. v. 
Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 761-63 (3d Cir. 1961)).
194 See Part II.B.2., supra.
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understood it to have nothing do to with emotion—or even to refer to the utter absence of 
emotional influence.
The following Subsections propose two situations in which emotion ought properly to be 
considered in determinations of adjudicative competence.  The first is that of defendants with 
psychiatric illnesses, particularly severe clinical depression, that can impair the accurate 
perception and processing of decision-relevant information, derail formation of self-protective 
motivation, and impair stable, self-interested choice.  In these cases, we may be concerned about 
a lack of emotional balance, as well as the damaging influence of a surfeit of particular 
emotions, such as grief and despair, and a dearth of others, such as joy or hope.  The second is 
that of defendants with neurological defects, usually caused by brain damage, that impair 
perception, processing, and expression of emotion in a manner that appears to disrupt rational 
decision-making.  Here, our concern stems from a general lack of emotion.195
1. Mood Disorder and Dusky-Relevant Emotional Dysfunction
A defendant’s competence may be threatened by mood disorder, a term encompassing a 
range of mental illness but generally used to signify either “unipolar” or “bipolar” depression.196
Unipolar depression captures the cluster of symptoms most commonly associated with 
depression: loss of interest in or pleasure from most activities; feelings of worthlessness, guilt, 
and despair; change (usually a retardation) in motor activity; decreased energy; difficulty 
195 This distinction between “organic” brain disease and psychiatric disease is firmly entrenched in the theory and 
practice of both law and medicine, but it is anything but a hard distinction, and its validity is increasingly under 
attack.  See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at xxx; DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 40 (“The 
distinction between diseases of the ‘brain’ and ‘mind,’ between ‘neurological’ problems and ‘psychological’ or 
‘psychiatric’ ones, is an unfortunate cultural inheritance that permeates society and medicine.  It reflects a basic 
ignorance of the relation between brain and mind.  Diseases of the brain are seen as tragedies visited on people who 
cannot be blamed for their condition, while diseases of the mind, especially those that affect conduct and emotion, 
are seen as social inconveniences for which sufferers have much to answer.”).
196 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 345-36.
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thinking, concentrating, or making decisions; and, frequently, thoughts of suicide.197  Depression 
also may incorporate manic episodes, periods associated with an unusually elevated mood (such 
as euphoria), psychomotor agitation, inflated self-esteem and grandiosity, pressured speech, and 
poor judgment.198  A person in whom major depressive episodes and manic episodes alternate 
generally will be diagnosed as suffering from “bipolar” disorder, or what is referred to 
colloquially as “manic depression.”199  Some manifestations of these disorders are relatively 
short-lived or can have but minor effects on functioning.200  While such manifestations might 
have some impact on rational decision-making—for example, were a defendant required to make 
a very consequential choice while in the midst of a severe but short-term depressive or manic 
episode—competence generally is liable to be seriously threatened only by more severe and 
persistent manifestations, particularly where latitude is given for choices to be postponed until a 
short-term episode has passed.201
The effects of severe clinical depression on, inter alia, attention, perception, 
concentration, and memory are well-recognized in the clinical literature, and any one these 
effects could derail one or more of the stages of competence-relevant decision-making.202 On 
the perceptive level, the severely depressed may focus so disproportionately on mood-congruent 
stimuli as to neglect important contrary information.  For example, such persons may ponder or 
197 See id. at 349-50 (definition of Major Depressive Episode); 369 (Major Depressive Disorder defined as history of 
one or more Major Depressive Episodes without a history of Manic, Mixed, or Hypomanic Episodes).
198 See id. at 357-59 (definition of Manic Episode).
199 An extremely rapid and temporally compressed switching between depressive and manic symptoms may be 
characterized as a “mixed episode.”  Id. at 362-63 (definition of Mixed Episode); 382-83 (definition of Bipolar I 
Disorder, characterized by one or more Manic Episodes or Mixed Episodes, frequently with one ore more Major 
Depressive Episodes). See generally KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND 
MADNESS (1995) (personal history of professor of psychiatry’s struggle with manic-depressive illness).
200 See, e.g., id. at 376-77, 381-82 (Dysthymic Disorder or Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified may not 
entail serious functional deficits); id. at 365 (a Hypomanic Episode may be of brief duration).
201 See, e.g., id. at 349 (a Major Depressive Episode will have “clinically significant impairments in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning”).
202 See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 345-428; 2 KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY 1338-77 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000); SEVERE DEPRESSIVE 
DISORDERS (Leon Grunhaus & John F. Greden eds., 1994).
Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
46
commit suicide out of “a desire to give up in the face of perceived insurmountable obstacles or 
an intense wish to end an excruciatingly painful emotional state that is perceived by the person to 
be without end,” though a non-depressed person might perceive other, more hopeful, facts and 
possibilities.203 Depression-linked perceptive and understanding deficits may become so severe 
as to incorporate delusions, hallucinations, and other symptoms characteristic of thought 
disorder.  For example, the depressed may develop feelings of “worthlessness or guilt … of 
delusional proportions (e.g., a person who is convinced that he or she is personally responsible 
for world poverty).”204 Moreover, depression appears to significantly derail normal appreciation, 
preventing formation of self-interested motivation.  A severely depressed person may be capable 
of accurately grasping the factual parameters of her situation and options but report simply not 
caring about what the correct course of action might be or how it might hinder or further her 
personal well-being.205  Even if the depressed person does care about risk, the normal direction 
of such caring may be reversed: she may want to take undue risks and may choose a clearly self-
harming outcome.206
Nor are major depressive episodes the only culprits: the mania associated with bipolar 
depression also can profoundly distort perception, reasoning, and choice.  Manic persons
generally will be highly distractible and unable to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant 
203 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 351.
204 Id. at xxx. See generally JAMISON, supra note 199 (describing psychotic aspects of author’s manic episodes).
205 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 410-11, 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Moran’s remorse and guilt might have made 
him “inclined to exert less effort towards his own defense,” and he reported the he “really didn’t care about 
anything” at the time of trial, leading him to a “self-destructive choice”).  This connection has been discussed, albeit 
in a quite limited fashion, within the literature on competence to consent to medical treatment and experimentation.  
See Carl Elliot, Caring About Risks: Are Severely Depressed Patients Competent to Consent to Research?, 54 
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 113, 114 (1997).  In a very preliminary exploration of the subject, a team of researchers 
suggested that depressed and manic persons display distorted premises when making personally relevant decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty.  See Harold J. Bursztajn et al., Beyond Cognition: The Role of Disordered Affective 
States in Impairing Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 383, 383-85 
(1991) (“the ext[a]nt models” for judging such competence “have tended to emphasize cognitive processes as the 
sole elements of competence.  The role of affect and of affective disorders in impairing competence has been 
scanted.”).
206 See Elliot, supra note 214, at 115.
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stimuli and thoughts.  Those experiencing mania often will exhibit disturbances of thought form, 
such as extremely fast, pressured, tangential, and even nonsensical speech, as well as of thought 
content, such as “[g]randiose delusions” as to their personal power and importance.207 On the 
level of reasoning, the manic are prone to overestimate wildly their personal abilities and 
chances of success in difficult situations.  Further, persons experiencing mania are prone to 
impulsive and imprudent choices, often in service of seeking immediate pleasure and 
gratification.208  The extreme lability of affect associated with mania also can occasion frequent 
and dramatic changes of course, obviating decision-making consistency.209
Despite these dramatic effects, the academic literature and caselaw generally do not 
reflect any significant examination of the effects of depression, whether unipolar or bipolar, on 
adjudicative competence.210  However, because mood-disordered defendants present with some 
regularity, so too do these issues.  Perhaps because of the lack of a strong theoretical exploration 
of mood disorder in this context, the caselaw reflects a highly confused attitude as to its 
relevance.  
207 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 357.  Bipolar depressives in whom thought disorder plays a prominent role may 
be diagnosed as suffering from either a mood disorder with psychotic features or schizoaffective disorder.  See id. at 
319-23; see also JAMISON, supra note 199, at 181.  For an empirical analysis of competence cases in which affective 
disorder and psychoticism are presented together, see Viljoen et al., supra note 168, at 28, 33-34 (study found 
“significant correlations between depression and impaired understanding and between withdrawal and impaired 
reasoning on the MacCAT-CA for defendants with psychotic disorders”; another “found that conceptual 
disorganization and delusional thinking had a stronger impact on legal abilities in defendants with affective 
disorders than those with schizophrenia”); see also Hoge et al., supra note 81, at 337 & Table 1, 340-43 & Table 6.
208 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 357-58; see also id. at 359 (“The person may be hostile and physically 
threatening to others.  Some individuals, especially those with psychotic features, may become physically assaultive 
and suicidal.  Adverse consequences of a Manic Episode (e.g., involuntary hospitalization, difficulties with the law, 
or serious financial difficulties) often result from poor judgment and hyperactivity.”).
209 See id. at 357.
210 As previously noted, such issues sometimes are mentioned in passing.  See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 18, at 575 (a 
decision may be non-delusional but nonetheless be “powerfully influenced by delusional beliefs or pathological 
emotions … Organic deficits, retardation, psychotic thought disorder, delirium and dementia, extreme phobia or 
panic, anxiety, euphoria and depression may impair a defendant’s capacity to weigh information in order to make 
rational choices, consistent with starting premises and assigned values”); see also Welsh S. White, Defendants Who 
Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 873-75(1987).  It is also possible that, because certain specific 
manifestations of depression can include psychosis, those particular manifestations might be captured by a Lafferty-
like test.  However, the non-psychotic manifestations will not be.
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On the one hand, depression is sufficiently well-recognized (and its effects potentially so 
devastating) that courts sometimes take note of it,211 and sometimes rely on it to support 
incompetence findings.  In Drope v. Missouri, for example, the Supreme Court found that while 
a recent suicide attempt did not per se signal incompetence, it was highly relevant to whether a 
competence inquiry was required, presumably because it provides some indication of serious 
depression.212  More recent cases reflect a similar acknowledgment that depression is relevant, 
though there is no particular consensus as to how or explanation of why.213  This was the case in
State v. Holland, in which the Supreme Court of Utah relied on the defendant’s bipolar mood 
disorder to reverse a trial court’s finding of competence and remand for a hearing.214  Though the 
court did not explain why manic depression signaled possible incompetence, it seemed irritated 
with the trial court for relying heavily its assessment of Holland as “articulate,” suggesting that it 
may have found the trial court’s test overly cognitive.215
On the other hand, courts also—and perhaps more frequently—dismiss the import of 
depression in a manner that reflects a strong privileging of cognition.216  Indeed, the dissenting 
judge in Holland focused on the defendant’s lack of evident thought disorder, apparently 
211 See nn.195-97, infra (mentions of depression in Dusky, Drope, and Godinez); see also Wilcoxson v. State, 22 
S.W.3d 289, 308 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
212 See 420 U.S. 162, 179-80 (1975).
213 See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 935 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.C. 1996); Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 339 (10th Cir. 
1991).
214 921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996).  An expert testified on an earlier remand that Holland “suffered from a mental illness 
that is known as bipolar disorder with mixed features,” or “manic depressive illness,” and that he had been 
incompetent “due to impulsivity, poor judgment, and the suicidality [sic] that he expressed at the time.”  Id. at 434. 
215 Id. at 435.  Oddly, the court apparently considered Holland’s mood disorder relevant only to the “ability to 
consult with counsel” prong of Dusky.
216 See, e.g., Myers v. Texas, No. 06-04-00033-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *3-5 (Tex. App. Oct. 5, 2004)
(evidence that defendant had long history of bipolar disorder and hospitalization did not indicate a “severe mental 
illness” requiring further inquiry, particularly in light of his factual understanding of case and “rational dialogue” 
with counsel); United States v. Pappert, 45 F. Supp.2d 1231, 1235-36 (D. Kan. 1999) (history of hospitalization not 
sufficient to overcome impression of defendant as “lucid and rational”); Moore v. Texas, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1999); Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 62 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Rivers v. Turner, 874 F.2d 771, 
774 (11th Cir. 1989) (no inquiry by counsel warranted despite repeated and recent suicide attempts and psychiatric 
treatment, as defendant could communicate with counsel, understand defense strategy, and respond appropriately to 
questions). 
Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
49
regarding affective disorder to be irrelevant.217  Depression’s negation of self-protective 
motivation often has met with a similarly dismissive attitude.  For example, in United States v. 
Rivera, two court-appointed experts agreed that the defendant suffered from clinical depression 
and was highly unmotivated to assist in his defense.218  The court nonetheless found him 
competent, crediting testimony from one expert that Rivera had “the ability to effectively 
communicate with his attorney and to assist in the planning of his defense but simply chooses not 
to do so,”219 and rejecting contrary evidence that “depression prevents the defendant from being 
motivated enough to communicate with his attorneys.”220  It then recounted apparently “rational” 
behavior, such as speaking coherently, as further evidence of Rivera’s competence.221 The court 
appeared to believe that depressed persons could be motivated to care about their fate if they 
chose to be so motivated.222 In addition to being tautological, such reasoning signals a 
fundamental disregard of the role of emotion-dependent appreciation and motivation within 
rational decision-making.
217 921 P.2d at 438 (Howe, J., dissenting) (Holland—who denied depression and suicidal ideation—appeared to 
understand the consequences of his decisions, and was not “out of touch” in the Lafferty sense but instead “was 
always well rooted in reality”).  
218 No. 90 CR 1001-1, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 349 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1995).  Rivera initially had been deemed 
incompetent and unlikely to be restored to competency in the foreseeable future; he was committed on the basis of 
dangerousness.  After a period of treatment he was again examined for competency; those evaluations were the 
subject of the instant opinion.  Both experts found that Rivera suffered from, inter alia, “a major affective disorder” 
and was “depressed.” Id. at *8, 12.
219 Id. at *9, 14.  One expert believed that Rivera, at least in part because of his depression, saw no point to 
cooperating in his defense.  See id. at *10 & n.2.  However, he also believed that he was competent because his 
depression was not “severe enough to impair his ability to participate in the proceedings or to understand the legal 
consequences of the proceedings.”  Id.
220 Id. at *13.  The defense expert also believed that Rivera exhibited “a type of psychosis, manifesting itself in 
magical or delusional thinking,” a finding the court rejected.  However, the court also made clear that this expert’s 
major reason for finding Rivera incompetent was not psychosis but rather the depression that prevented him from 
caring enough to take self-protective action.  See id. at *12-13.
221 Id. at *15. Cf. Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 813 N.E.2d 465 (Mass. 2004) (while taking seriously import of 
defendant’s depression and self-harming goals, ultimately upholding competence finding).
222 See also United States v. Landsman, 366 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (depressed defendant competent 
despite “expressed lack of will to assist his defense” because he had the “ability” to so choose); cf. North Carolina v. 
Avery, 337 S.E.2d 786, 790 (N.C. 1985) (citing expert testimony that the removed portion of defendant’s frontal 
lobes controlled “affect and mood but has no significant effect on memory,” such that the defendant appeared to 
“have chosen not to remember the events of the allegations”).
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The tension between these attitudes as to the impact of depression is perhaps most clearly 
seen in the very thorny context of execution volunteer cases.  Because competent defendants are 
free to decide whether to challenge a lawfully imposed punishment, death-row inmates generally 
will be presumed able to acquiesce to execution;223 but because such acquiescence may spring 
from suicidal depression, purported best friends often come forward to try and prevent what they 
consider a suicide by execution.224
It appears that, in this battle, confusion reigns supreme225 but that a disproportionate 
focus on cognitive abilities is winning.  This certainly was the case in Rumbaugh v. Procunier.226
Two forensic examiners agreed that Rumbaugh was “profoundly depressed” and that such 
depression substantially affected “his capacity in the premises” on which his decisions were 
reached, and might “act as a coercive force and impair[] his ability to exercise free will to make a 
223 These cases are governed by the “rational choice” rule of Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966), which post-
Godinez likely has the same meaning as Dusky rational understanding. See I.A., supra.
224 See, e.g., White, supra note 210, at 873-75; State v. Passaro, 567 S.E.2d 862, 865 n.9 (S.C. 2002); State  v. 
Sagastegui, 954 P.2d 1311, 1322 (Wash. 1998); Smith v. Armontrout, 865 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1988). To be sure, so 
long as the United States has a system of capital punishment, there must be some circumstances under which a 
death-row inmate competently may choose to forgo the fight for her life. In some situations a person may have not 
just logical but sound reasons for wanting to end life, see Washington v. Gluckberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. 
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), and respect for individual autonomy dictates that inmates enjoy the same right as others 
to make such a choice.  But clearly the situation is altered where the death is to come not from disease or a reasoned
decision to abandon treatment but instead by state-ordered execution; and in any right-to-die context the possible 
impact of affective disorder should be robustly considered. See OR. REV. STAT. §§127.825 (2003) (“No medication 
to end a patient's life in a humane and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing the 
counseling determines that the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression 
causing impaired judgment.”).  For an excellent exploration of the issues raised by execution volunteers and a 
proposed test for distinguishing between inmates whose choice not to fight execution is permissible and those for 
whom the choice should be disallowed as suicidally motivated, see John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: Volunteers, 
Suicide, and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005).
225 Consider the long and hotly contested battle over whether Michael Ross was competent to abandon challenges to 
his 2005 execution by the State of Connecticut.  Ross for years attempted to be put to death—indeed, after his 
original death sentence was overturned, he had sought unsuccessfully to stipulate to the death penalty, which was 
then reimposed after a new hearing—but a series of purported next friends argued that his desire to die was caused 
by the depression associated with “death row syndrome.”  A District Court first credited expert testimony that Ross’ 
decision was “driven by suicidal despair, rather than an exercise of free will.”  Ross v. Lantz, No. 05-CV-116 (RC) 
at 6 (D.Conn. Jan. 25, 2004).  However, Ross eventually was found competent and executed.  See 2005 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 1116; Ross ex rel. Dunham v. Lantz, 408 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2006 (2005).
226 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919 (1985).
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decision.” 227 They nonetheless concluded that he was competent to exercise rational choice 
because he understood his position and was able to “think coherently” and reason “logically.”228
The Fifth Circuit, though recognizing the challenge of determining what “rational” might mean 
in such circumstances, noted that Rumbaugh had filed “an extremely coherent and well-reasoned 
pro se state habeas corpus petition” and upheld the finding of competence because Rumbaugh’s 
decision to end his life was “logical,” given the intense suffering caused by his depression. 229
As with the majority opinion in Rivera, the Rumbaugh majority’s approach fails to give 
adequate consideration to the disabling effects of depression.  As the dissenting judge in 
Rumbuagh correctly argued, the majority opinion rested on a limited and largely cognition-
driven standard of rationality, erroneously equating “’rational’ with logical.” 230  On the 
majority’s view, “a person’s cognition, his understanding, is deemed tantamount to an ability to 
choose rationally.”231  Such a result displays a lack of respect for the vital contributions of 
emotion, particularly through the mechanisms of appraisal and appreciation, to rational decision-
making.
227 Id. at 400.
228 Id. at 399-400.  At the hearing, Rumbaugh (apparently to make clear that he had affirmatively chosen to die) 
lunged at a court officer with a hand-made weapon and commanded the officer to shoot him; he was indeed shot, 
though he did not die. See id. at 397; see also Rumbaugh v. Estelle, 558 F. Supp. 651, 653-54 (N.D. Tex. 1983).  
While he was being taken to a hospital, one expert testified that the incident supported his conclusion that 
Rumbaugh’s decision to die was rational.  See 753 F.2d at 397.
229 Id. at 402 (“Rumbaugh is able to feed relevant facts into a rational decision-making process and come to a 
reasoned decision … one of the facts is that Rumbaugh is mentally ill, he has severe depression, with no hope of 
successful treatment which would reduce his current mental discomfort to a tolerable level ….  [His] assessment 
of his legal and medical situations, and the options available to him, are reasonable[, though] if the medical 
situation vis-à-vis treatment were different, Rumbaugh might reach a different decision about continuing judicial 
proceedings.  In other words, Rumbaugh’s disease influences his decision because it is the source of mental pain 
which contributes to his invitation of death.”); id. at 403 (refusing to conclude “as a matter of law that a person 
who finds his life situation intolerable and who welcomes an end to the life experience is necessarily legally 
incompetent to forgo further legal proceedings which might extend that experience”).
230 Id. at 404 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); see also 558 F. Supp. at 653 (expert testified that Rumbaugh’s decision was 
“rational or at least logical”). Judge Goldberg’s arguments were echoed by Justices Marshall and Brennan in a 
dissent from the denial of certiorari.  See Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919, 919 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Though Judge Goldberg argued that Rees “rational choice” competence was quite different from Dusky
“rational understanding” competence and that Rumbaugh would have been Dusky-competent, see 753 F.2d at 411-
12, the case was decided before Godinez, and such comments no longer have persuasive force.
231 Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 409.
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A similarly dismissive attitude often attends the impact of depression on choice. 
Consider Smith v. Armontrout, in which the Eighth Circuit deemed competent a severely 
depressed defendant who had over the course of his imprisonment changed his mind as to 
whether to pursue or abandon appeals at least ten times.232 The dissenters urged careful attention 
to the destabilizing effects of depression with its “frequent mood changes”233 and “unstable and 
self-destructive tendencies.”234  But though such lability is a common aspect of depression, 
particularly the bipolar sort, the majority without significant elaboration deemed Smith capable 
of choosing to “suffer the consequences of” his crime and declined to order a new evaluation.235
Armontrout does not appear to be an outlier case.  While inability to maintain a consistent choice 
preference may be seen by courts as irritating or threatening to finality, it seldom is considered as 
an indicator of possible adjudicative incompetence.
Thus, the cases reveal a very real and persistent disagreement over the appropriate level 
of consideration to be given to affective disorder, particularly clinical depression, when 
determining adjudicative competence.  Even those examiners and courts that think depression 
relevant appear to lack an articulated theory as to why.  And, unfortunately, the general 
resolution of that debate reflects simplistic notions of decision-making, consisting of nothing 
more than intact cognition plus the powers of deductive reasoning.
232 865 F.2d 1502, 1503-06 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also id. at 1512 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
233 Id. at 1513 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 1511 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).  The dissenters quoted the following testimony of forensic examiners: “Now, 
the problem there for me is on the rational side.  In the past some courts have interpreted that as an affective 
component that’s a lot more subjective. … [I]t’s a fuzzy area.  I’m not sure that person who is facing death, who is 
condemned to die, who experiences hopelessness anyway, who does have some lack in social skills, in terms of 
coping skills, I’m not sure that that allows a person to be ‘fully rational.’  I don’t know what the standard is or what 
the ideal is there.” Id. at 1509.  “He’s cognitively aware.  I don’t know how emotionally aware he is.”  Id. at 1510.
235 Id. at 1507.
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2. Brain Damage and Dusky-Relevant Emotional Dysfunction
Another manifestation of emotional dysfunction relevant to competent decision-making 
is that attending certain forms of brain damage, particularly to regions of the frontal lobes.  The 
emotional deficits associated with such brain damage appear to be highly correlated with 
persistent inability to make self- protective choices in situations of risk to one’s own thriving, 
despite retention of cognitive capacity.  Though such disorder almost certainly  is less common 
than clinical depression, these cases now are beginning to surface and their proper resolution 
promises to be hotly contested.
Evidence of concurrent emotion-and-reasoning deficits attending brain damage is found 
in the cognitive neuroscience literature—particularly (but by no means exclusively) the work of 
Antonio Damasio236—and is grounded in the story of the most famous neurological patient in 
history, Phineas Gage.237  In 1848 Gage survived a railroad-construction accident in which an 
iron rod was propelled at high speed through his head.  Amazingly, he remained conscious and 
appeared to recover with nothing more than disinfectant and bandages.  His miraculous recovery, 
however, was elusive.  It was only a matter of time before all who knew him concluded that 
“Gage was no longer Gage.”238  Whereas before he had been polite, prudent, and hard-working, 
he became impatient, foul-mouthed, and prone to fits of rage.  Though still intelligent and 
skilled, Gage became unable to keep a job; in fact, as his doctor recalled, “he was good at 
236 Other important work on the role of emotion in decision-making has been pursued by, inter alia, Edmund Rolls.  
See, e.g., EDMUND T. ROLLS, THE BRAIN AND EMOTION (1999).
237 An account of the Gage case may be found in DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 3-33; see also
MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 537-39 (2d ed. 2002); 
Michael S. Gazzaniga & Megan S. Steven, Free Will in the Twenty-First Century: A Discussion of Neuroscience 
and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 51, 59-62 (Brent Garland 
ed., 2004).
238 GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 539.
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‘always finding something which did not suit him,’” and appeared to have become incapable of 
planning or forethought.239  He became transient and died penniless 13 years later.240
The Gage case led to a number of fundamental insights ani mating  the modern 
neurosciences, including that “lesions of circumscribed areas of the brain could cause the loss 
of very specific mental or nervous functions in humans.”241  Further, that the “new Gage” 
lacked emotional regulation and became unable to plan for (or execute action toward) a stable 
future suggested that such abilities might be both intertwined and dependent on the brain areas 
damaged in the accident.242  Though many brain areas now have been shown to be involved 
with emotional perception, processing, regulation, and expression,243 damage to the
ventromedial portions of prefrontal cortex—the areas damaged in Gage244—has been shown to 
interfere with “social and emotional competence while not affecting cognitive competence in 
239 DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 9, 11 (quoting Dr. John Harlow, who memorialized his 
interactions with Gage in John M. Harlow, Recovery from the passage of an iron bar through the head, 2 PUB. 
MASS. MED. SOC. 327 (1848), and John M. Harlow, Passage of an iron rod through the head, 39 BOSTON MED. & 
SURGICAL J. 389 (1848-49)).
240 See DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 7-10.
241 John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson, Social Neuroscience, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III, supra note 
155, at 977.  Of course, few patients suffer brain injury because of metal rods like Gage’s tamping iron; bullets to 
the head are far more common in modern life.  See, e.g., State v. Avery, 337 S.E.2d 786 (N.C. 1997) (defendant shot 
himself through head and portions of frontal lobes removed); State v. Shytle, 374 S.E.2d 573 (N.C. 1989) (self-
inflicted gunshot wound to head impaired defendant’s emotional responses).  Other causes also abound.  “Damage 
to the frontal lobes can be caused by a myriad of insults, including direct trauma, vascular lesions, infectious, 
degenerative and metabolic processes.”  Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 99, at 381; see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 381 
(defendant hit on head by brick as child and later shot himself in the head).
242 GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 533-39 (cases like that of Gage demonstrate 
that we “need to understand how emotion and motivation influence our ability to process information and choose 
actions. …  Although he showed no obvious impairment in his intelligence and perceptual or motor abilities, he was 
no longer able to evaluate appropriately the significance of events and regulate his emotional responses.”).
243 The brain areas most obviously implicated in emotion are the amygdala, hippocampus, orbitofrontal cortex, and 
ventromedial cortex.  See GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 537-76; Todd F. 
Heatherton et al., Introduction: Emotion and Social Neuroscience, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III, supra
note 155, at 973, 974.  For definitions and descriptions of these and other brain areas, see GAZZANIGA ET AL.,
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 62-95. The effect of brain damage to emotion-relevant brain areas on 
competence, and on decision-making generally, is a promising site of future research, both scientific and legal.
244 GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 538.  This research was made possible by the 
remarkable fact that Gage was buried with his tamping rod, and Dr. Harlow had his body exhumed and retained both 
the rod and Gage’s skull.  These were examined nearly a century later by Hanna Damasio and colleagues, who used 
computer simulation techniques to recreate the trajectory of the rod through Gage’s brain.  See Hanna Damasio et 
al., The return of Phineas Gage: The skull of a famous patient yields clues about the brain, 264 SCIENCE 1102 
(1994).
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other domains.”245  It therefore is to these areas—and to prefrontal cortex246 more generally—
that researchers have looked for an intersection between emotion and decision-making.
In Descartes’ Error Damasio describes clinical evidence of what he dubbed a “Gage 
matrix” of disabilities attending frontal lobe damage.  His most detailed description is of a 
patient known as “Elliot,” whom Damasio styled as a “modern-day Phineas Gage.”  Following 
surgery for a brain tumor in which portions of his frontal lobes were removed, Elliot went on a 
downward spiral—losing jobs, squandering money on suspect investment schemes, and 
alienating family members—that eventually resulted in inability to support himself.247
Examinations revealed that Elliot was intelligent, had intact cognitive abilities, and displayed 
normal knowledge of ethics, social conventions, and moral value.  On two measures of 
functioning, though, he was highly abnormal.  First, Elliot was emotionally flat.  He was able to 
recognize and describe the emotional salience of stimuli, such as pictures of gruesome injuries, 
but displayed no normal physiological reactions to such stimuli.248 Second, he displayed a 
profound dissociation between “real-life failure and laboratory normalcy” in making choices.249
In laboratory conditions, he was able to solve hypothetical problems as well or better than most, 
but in his personal life he continuously made disastrous choices in the face of clear warning 
signals, resulting in the loss of virtually all his assets and social supports.250  Damasio reports 
having examined twelve other patients with similar brain damage: each displayed the same 
245 Heatherton et al., supra note 254, at 974.
246 Prefrontal cortex is the most evolutionarily “new” portion of the human brain and is thought to be critical to 
“higher” brain functions, including reasoning and executive control.  See GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 75.
247 See DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 34-37.  Though this issue is not discussed by Damasio in 
detail, it signals another area of the law to which such emotional dysfunction could be relevant: that of entitlement to 
disability benefits.  Because of Elliot’s cognitive intactness, he initially was denied benefits; after Damasio’s 
investigation, he was granted benefits.
248 Id. at 45 (characterizing this emotionally flat state as “to know but not to feel”) (emphasis in original).
249 Id. at 45-46.  
250 Id. at 41-50.
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“combination of decision-making defect and flat emotion and feeling,” leading him to conclude 
that “the powers of reason and the experience of emotion decline together,” and that “their 
impairment stands out in a neuropsychological profile within which basic attention, memory, 
intelligence and language appear so intact that they could never be invoked to explain the 
patients’ failures in judgment.”251
The clinical evidence of this precise correlation between emotional dysfunction and 
impaired personal decision-making is limited—at least in part because brain damage is often 
diffuse, meaning that persons with damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex often will have 
damage elsewhere, such that “Gage matrix” symptoms may present as part of a larger and more 
varied set of disorders.252  Moreover, Damasio’s account of why emotion and reasoning are so 
intertwined is contested within cognitive neuroscience.253 His theory, rooted in what he calls the 
“somatic marker hypothesis,” appears directed primarily to appraisal, appreciation, and choice: 
lack of emotion, he has proposed, might prevent these persons “from assigning different values 
to different options,” making their “decision-making landscape hopelessly flat” or, perhaps, “too 
251 Id. at 53-56, 139 (those with prefrontal damage “cannot generate emotions relative to the images conjured up by 
certain categories of situation and stimuli, and thus cannot have the ensuing feeling,” but can experience primary 
emotions (such as instinctive fear) and thus may appear to have intact affect in some situations). This clarification is 
important, as it can explain Gage’s “fits of rage” and account for the fact that even persons like Elliot are capable of 
sometimes experiencing and expressing some emotion.  It would be very strange for literally all emotional capacity 
to be eliminated, as there is no single “emotion center” in the brain.
According to Damasio, individual expression of “Gage matrix” impairment will vary—for example, 
according to the stage of life at which the individual’s brain damage occurred.   However, he believes these persons 
to share a common core of impairments, including being “[r]igid and perseverant in their approach to life” and 
unable to organize their lives and futures; displaying stereotyped mannerisms; and having diminished experience of 
pleasure and pain.  Such patients will also display normal intelligence and a lack of motor, sensory, or 
communication defects.  Id. at 58.
252 For example, persons with damage to various regions of the frontal lobes may have broad impairments to what is 
called “executive function” or “executive control.”  Executive function refers to a cluster of high-level brain 
functions “which orchestrate relatively simple ideas, movements, or actions into complex goal-directed behavior.”  
Laurence B. McCullough et al., Implications of Impaired Executive Control Functions for Patient Autonomy and 
Surrogate Decision Making, 12 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 392 (2001) (impairment to executive control caused by, inter 
alia, depression, brain trauma or psychosis can cause “apathy and impairment of goal directed thinking; reduced 
emotional control resulting in marked personality changes … and diminished ability to engage in abstract 
thinking”); see also Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 99. at 377.
253 See, e.g., Beer, et al., supra note 127, at 1095-98 (presenting competing theories).
Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
57
shifty and unsustained” to support sound and consistent choices.254  Whether this account is 
correct remains to be rigorously tested.  But regardless of debates as to the nature of underlying 
mechanisms, it is now accepted that brain damage affecting emotional perception, processing, 
and expression—particularly damage to the frontal cortices—is correlated with diminished 
rationality, particularly in the realm of highly personal decision-making.255
This research has at least three important implications for assessments of adjudicative 
competence.  First, persons with specific forms of frontal lobe damage might with some 
regularity become defendants, as their extreme decision-making deficits may lead to poor 
choices (and, in rare cases, disinhibited and aggressive behaviors) with criminal consequences.256
If this is so, it is particularly important that adjudicative competence doctrine have a theory as to 
how such persons should be regarded.  Second, such persons may exhibit intact cognitive 
abilities and yet be incapable of the kind of high-stakes, highly personal decision-making 
254 DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 52-53.  Damasio also theorized that Elliot’s decision-making 
“defect appeared to set in at the late stages of reasoning, close to or at the point at which choice making or response 
selection must occur.”  Id. at 50-51.  
255 See, e.g., GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 547 (“The orbitofrontal cortex 
seems to be especially important for processing, evaluating, and filtering social and emotional information.  The 
result is that damage to this region impairs the ability to make decisions that require feedback from social or 
emotional cues.”); see also id. at 553 (“the orbitofrontal cortex must rely on learned information about the emotional 
qualities of stimuli in order to assess the utility of our actions”); Laurence R. Tancredi, Neuroscience Developments 
and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 237, at 71, 87-88.  Damasio asserts that while it “is true 
that “uncontrolled or misdirected emotion can be a major source of irrational behavior,” “[r]eduction in emotion 
may constitute an equally important source of irrational behavior.”  DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, 
at 52-53
Damasio’s theory of a “Gage matrix” also is supported by research on deficits among anosognosiacs, 
persons with right-hemisphere cortical damage who suffer obvious left-side motor defects (such as paralysis) but 
who fail consciously to recognize their affliction.  “Anosognistics have flattened emotion and feeling.  They are 
similar to frontal-damage patients in terms of highly impaired decision-making – but unlike frontal patients they are 
obviously disabled, and thus are likely shielded from many opportunities to make bad decisions.  Because “patients 
with prefrontal lesions appear neurologically normal,” they “can engage in a variety of social interactions that will 
easily expose their defective reasoning.” Id. at 67.
256 See, e.g., Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 99, at 381 (“Involvement with the legal system may especially be likely 
if pre-morbid antisocial, histrionic or narcissistic personality features are intensified following frontal lobe injury.”); 
see also GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 550 (while these patients generally are 
“more hurtful to themselves than others,” some with orbitofrontal damage might also exhibit “antisocial behavior 
disorders and difficulties controlling violent or aggressive impulses”). But see Gazzaniga & Steven, supra note 248, 
at 62. The possibility of post-brain-damage involvement in crime is strongly supported by the case of “Jane,” 
discussed infra.
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required of criminal defendants, and that inability will present together with—and perhaps be 
caused by—severe impairment in ability to experience and express emotion.  In these cases, 
failure to consider impaired emotional capacity might lead to an erroneous finding of 
competence, either because deadened emotion is not recognized as a clue leading to further 
inquiry that might uncover brain damage,257 or because of imposition of an overly cognitive test 
in which the emotion and decision-making deficits, even if proven, are dismissed as irrelevant.258
Third, other brain-damaged persons (for example, those with more diffuse sites of injury) may 
display the above-described impairments as well as cognitive and motor deficits.  In these cases, 
the danger of false negative might be lower; but as competence determinations look to the 
combined effects of impairments, failure to take seriously those going to emotion and personal 
decision-making could remove important information from the calculus.
These issues are novel, and to date are scarcely reflected in the caselaw.  However, to the 
limited extent that they have been addressed they have met with inconsistent results.  
Consider the case of “Jane,” a prominent member of society with a long and impressive 
record of educational and professional accomplishments and philanthropic activities. 259
Unbeknownst to her, she suffered from a congenital blood-flow defect known as an 
arteriovenous malformation (“AVM”), located in the left frontal lobe of her brain.  Very late in 
her life Jane began suddenly to engage in a series of obviously foolish financial schemes, and 
experienced a downfall much like that of Damasio’s Elliot.  She lost virtually all of her family’s 
money, was sued for financial improprieties, and eventually was convicted for minor 
257 Such was the case with “Jane,” a defendant whose case is discussed infra.
258 Cf. Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 99, at 382 (“commonly used screening tests which focus on memory or 
orientation may be relatively insensitive to deficits in executive functioning, making it easier for an examiner to be 
misled regarding competency in patients suffering frontal lobe injury”).
259 “Jane” is based on a former client of the author.  Out of respect for that defendant’s privacy and that of her 
family, the author has chosen not to identify her or discuss her case in detail in this Article.  All descriptions of Jane 
and her situation are based on factual statements made in publicly filed documents in her case.
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participation in what was revealed to be a fraudulent investment scheme.  The brain damage was 
discovered in the sentencing phase, after new defense counsel—seeking to determine the cause 
of her sharp change in life circumstances and struck by her odd emotional profile —arranged for 
psychiatric and developmental testing and, finally, a neurological exam and brain scan.  The scan 
both showed the AVM and revealed that at some point, likely quite late in Jane’s life and 
probably shortly before the start of her “downfall,” the AVM had ruptured and bled. Extensive
neuropsychological testing then revealed that Jane retained her extremely high intelligence and 
virtually all of her cognitive abilities, though she did display the highly tangential and 
perseverative speech characteristic of a thought disorder.260 This general cognitive intactness 
had largely masked others’ ability to recognize her progressively more serious deficits.  
However, her affect was noticeably constricted and she was consistently unable to make self-
protective choices in personal, particularly financial, matters.  Significantly, she appeared utterly 
incapable of perceiving the mental instability of the fraud’s ringleader and the implausibility of 
her representations and promises, though those facts were immediately evident to others.  She 
also appeared strangely detached from the extremely serious repercussions of her conviction for 
both her and her family.  A court-appointed expert, after considering the defense’s evidence and 
examining Jane, opined that she was adjudicatively incompetent.261
Jane’s case would appear to be the first in which an examiner has explicitly relied on 
evidence of a “Gage matrix” disorder to make a finding of adjudicative incompetence.  Other 
260 Jane’s speech disorders also appeared linked to brain damage, in that scarring from the AVM rupture extended 
into areas connected with production of language.  While others had noticed her increasingly bizarre speech, it 
appears to have been written off because she was getting older and perhaps more “quirky.”  She was also a speaker 
of English as a foreign language, a factor that may have impeded some persons’ ability to discern that her speech 
had become disordered.
261 The evidence of Jane’s previously undiscovered brain damage also raised significant issues as to her legal 
responsibility for the conduct of conviction.  For a variety of reasons not relevant to this discussion, that issue has 
not been and likely never will be litigated.
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instances in which similar issues were raised have met with very different outcomes, as decision-
makers in those cases regarded evidence of emotional dysfunction to be irrelevant.
The first such case is North Carolina v. Shytle.  Wanda Graybeal Shytle shot herself in 
the head after killing a number of family members.  Expert examinations conducted after her 
self-inflicted injury indicated that while her intelligence and memory were intact, the significant
damage to Shytle’s brain “impaired her emotional reactions to situations” and led to 
inappropriate behavior, such as laughing at serious moments, that suggested that she failed to 
grasp the seriousness of her plight.  One examiner testified that she was incompetent because 
“her affective appreciation of events has been lost,” preventing her from “understanding her legal 
situation and cooperating with her attorney.”262 The North Carolina Supreme Court was asked 
whether, “if an individual’s cognitive, reasoning ability is separated from basic emotional 
responses or affect,” she would be competent to aid in her defense and proceed to trial.”263
Two trial judges, without significant discussion, determined that she was competent, and 
the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed:
There was evidence that the defendant had an IQ within the normal range and that 
she knew what the charges were and what could happen to her if she was 
convicted.  If this did not worry or upset her because of her altered medical 
condition, it does not mean that she did not understand those facts. … If the 
defendant’s situation did not bother her it does not mean she did not comprehend 
it.264
This analysis—in which the extreme abnormality of Shytle’s lack of emotional reaction to her 
potentially dire situation was sanitized by the presence of bare intellectual understanding—
262 374 S.E.2d at 575.
263 374 S.E.2d 573, 573, 575 (N.C. 1989).
264 Id. at 575-76.  Recall that apparently being “unbothered” by the very serious ramifications of her criminal case 
was also a symptom exhibited by Jane, and was one of the attributes that most troubled defense counsel and led to 
further investigation of her impairment. 
Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
61
ignores the importance of appreciation in shaping self-protective motivations and goals.265 In 
Shytle, then, cognitive function simply trumped emotional dysfunction, without a considered 
effort to determine how the latter might have affected rationality.  
Similar evidence met with a similar disposition in the recent clemency petition of Donald 
Beardslee, executed in 2005 for taking part in a multiple murder to avenge a small debt.266
Though the issue argued there was not competency but, rather, potential mitigation providing a 
reason to spare his life, the way in which the brain-damage arguments were treated is relevant 
and illuminating.267 In an eleventh-hour bid for clemency, Beardslee’s attorneys came forward 
with new evidence suggesting that he had brain damage—present at birth and aggravated by two 
head injuries in adulthood, one of which resulted in coma—that, among other deficits, impaired 
emotional capacity.268 According to a defense expert and family members, throughout his life 
Beardslee appeared unable appropriately to express emotion, was unusually gullible and naïve, 
265 Id. at 575.  Even if the behavioral expression of Shytle’s apparent affective disorder was not considered relevant 
to competence, it likely should have been considered relevant to whether her appearance to a jury would deprive her 
of a fair trial.  See, e.g., Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138; see also id. at 142-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (drugs may 
unfairly alter defendant’s “emotional responses”); Sell, 539 U.S. at 166, 179 (same); see also note 267, infra (raising 
similar issues with regard to Donald Beardslee and “Jane”).
266 See, e.g., Bob Egelko et al., Donald Beardslee executed; Killer put to death at San Quentin, S.F. CHRON., A-1 
(Jan. 19, 2005).
267 Not only was Beardslee’s brain injury relevant to his conduct, in that it might suggest that he responded to the 
chaotic and stressful circumstances of the crime with confusion and panic, leading him to imitate the actions of his 
co-defendants, but it might also explain imposition of the death penalty, as his “constricted emotional range was 
likely to be viewed” by the jury “as indicating aloofness, indifference or even callousness.”  Declaration of Rubin C. 
Gur, Ph.D., Ex. 51 in Support of Petition for Executive Clemency, Donald J. Beardslee (dated Dec. 30, 2004)
(hereinafter “Gur Declaration”), at 5-6 ¶¶11-12.  Similarly, Jane’s relatively flat affect could make her appear 
“cold,” and the prosecutor repeatedly expressed frustration with what he considered her lack of remorse.  Further, it 
was reported to the author that several schoolchildren who observed part of her trial on a field trip were scared by 
Jane’s vacant demeanor and regarded her as “spooky.”  These concerns echo those expressed in Riggins, 504 U.S. at 
142-44, and Sell, 539 U.S. at 181, 185, with regard to the potential for psychotropic medication to alter a defendant’s 
emotional expression.  But see State  v. Gwaltney, 468 P.2d 433, 434-35 (Wash. 1970) (holding that defendant’s 
uncontrollably inappropriate emotional expression could be adequately explained to jury).
268 See generally Petition for Executive Clemency, Donald J. Beardslee (dated Dec. 30, 2004).  According to that 
petition and the supporting materials, Beardslee showed early signs of brain damage and throughout his life 
exhibited both abnormal emotional perception and expression and poor judgment.  As a young man he suffered head 
injuries a car accident, and several years later was hospitalized with skull fracture and frontal lobe injury after being 
hit by a falling tree.  
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and exhibited terrible judgment when making personal decisions under conditions of stress and 
uncertainty.269
In a response closely paralleling that in the Shytle case, prosecutors offered a purely 
cognitive theory:  Beardslee could not be seriously brain-damaged, at least not in a legally 
meaningful way, because he had a relatively high IQ, well-developed cognitive skills, got good 
grades, had before his incarceration been capable of caring for himself, and had a solid work 
history.270  To the extent that Beardslee failed to show emotion, the state argued, that merely 
showed his lack of remorse. The Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger, agreed.  
While acknowledging that the claim that brain injury left Beards lee “unable to process emotions 
… warrant[ed] more extensive discussion,” Schwarzenegger declined to enter that discussion and 
instead concluded that Beardslee’s apparently intact cognition answered the inquiry.271 Though 
“many observers ha[d] reported that Beardslee” had “a flattened affect for much of his life” and 
had argued that “this lack of emotion is a symptom and byproduct of his mental deficiency,” 
Schwarzenegger concluded that the fact that “Beardslee had a flat affect … does not have 
269 According to Dr. Rubin Gur, damage to portions of Beardslee’s right-hemisphere prefrontal cortex significantly 
impaired his “ability to inhibit responses to cognitive and emotional stimuli,” thus damaging his ability to plan and 
engage in “reasoned, purposeful, self-controlled goal-directed behavior.”  See Gur Declaration, supra note 278, at 3 
¶8. See also Dean E. Murphy, Brain Damage Is Cited in Plea for Killer’s Life, N.Y. TIMES A14 (Jan. 18, 2005) 
(quoting Dr. Gur as testifying at clemency hearing, “He couldn’t really understand people’s emotions.  He couldn’t 
know himself how to behave, so he would rely on others to interpret things for him.  He would mimic people’s 
behavior.”).  Beardslee’s “impairments in the areas of emotional processing” were consistent with his “stiff, 
emotionally constricted, relatively flat affect” and “poor ability to decipher emotional cues.”  Gur Declaration, supra 
note 278, at 3 ¶8.  
A very significant limitation on Dr. Gur’s analysis was that he had not personally examined Beardslee, nor 
had he access to any brain scans; he presented what he called a “behavioral image” of Beardslee’s brain, a 
computer-generated schematic representation of clinical data that essentially hypothesized what the brain probably 
looked like.  See id. at ¶6. Therefore, one of the requests put forth by Beardslee’s lawyers was that the execution be 
stayed for the purpose of obtaining actual brain scans.  That request was denied.  In contrast, in Jane’s case the 
ability of the defense to obtain sophisticated brain-scanning technology yielded compelling evidence of her brain 
damage and its precise location.
270 Letter of James P. Fox et al. to Governor Schwarzenegger 7-8, 12 (dated Jan. 7, 2005).  The prosecutor in Jane’s 
case also repeatedly denied that she could be significantly brain-damaged, primarily because of her intact 
intelligence.
271 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Statement of Decision: Request for Clemency by Mr. Donald J. Beardslee 3 
(dated Jan. 18, 2005).
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persuasive value” showing that “lacked capacity to make reasoned decisions.”272  Beardslee was 
executed.273
In both the Beardslee and Shytle cases, then, legal decision-makers held that evidence of 
cognitive function simply overrides evidence of emotional dysfunction.  The fact that these states 
of being can coexist and, further, that emotional dysfunction can correlate with and signal 
rational decision-making deficits even where cognition is intact, was simply not considered 
credible.  Nor did the decision-makers in those cases appear to regard as important the fact that 
persons with profoundly impaired emotional function might be incapable of formulating the self-
protective motivation that would animate active participation in their defense, including 
cooperation with counsel. In contrast, in Jane’s case an examiner took such emotional 
impairments seriously, in conjunction with evidence of other (and arguably more cognitive) 
impairment, and determined her to be adjudicatively incompetent.  This juxtaposition, paralleling 
that of the courts’ and examiners’ varying treatment of depression, indicates that current theory 
and practice fail to reflect a consistent and sophisticated understanding of emotion’s influence on 
rational decision-making.
III. Measurement and Policy Considerations
Thus far, this Article has argued that both cognition and emotion are integral to the 
rational decision-making on which adjudicative competence depends.  It has urged that 
decisional competence be recognized as key, that examiners and courts—whose interdependent 
efforts are vital to determinations of adjudicative competence—undertake any given competence 
272 Id. at 3-4.
273 Moreover, the Governor’s decision, by relying on the assessment that Beardslee’s impairments did not prevent 
him from knowing right from wrong, see id. at 5, further reflects a fundamental confusion between the legal 
standards governing clemency and insanity, in a way that directly parallels the persistent confusion between 
competence and insanity.  This parallel suggests that decision-makers looking to competence might similarly make 
decisions based on the incorrect standard.
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determination by reference to the component parts of rational decision-making, and that such 
examination articulate and take seriously the effects of both thought disorder and emotional 
disorder, particularly where the latter is not adequately captured by a cognitive focus.  It has 
argued specifically that courts and examiners should consider whether clinical depression 
(whether unipolar or bipolar) has impaired substantially a defendant’s perception, appreciation, 
and ability to choose, and that the emotional deficits attending certain forms of brain damage 
should be regarded as important concomitants of impaired capacity for reasoning and choice. It 
is worth asking, though, whether this proposal is amenable to implementation that would further 
the goals of adjudicative competence doctrine.  This Part addresses those concerns.
The question of whether “emotional competence” is amenable to accurate, consistent 
definition and measurement is no small matter.  This difficulty is not unique to emotional 
considerations; because of the open-textured nature of the construct, it inures to all attempts to 
define and measure competence.274 The real question, then, is whether there is something about 
emotional disorder that makes it so different from cognitive disorder as to prevent it from being 
articulated, measured, and considered as part of the legal test for adjudicative competence.
While there is good reason to raise this question, it should be answered in the negative.  
One prominent competence theorist, Paul Appelbaum, raised just this question within the 
context of a parallel debate over capacity to consent to medical treatment.275  Appelbaum agreed 
that “disturbing questions” had been raised “about the lack of attention to emotional issues in 
274 See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 101 (“If competency is reduced to a construct, and if it cannot be 
reduced to a particular operational definition, and if even court decisions themselves are (more or less) fallible, then 
how can one proceed to improve the reliability and validity of assessment procedures used (or to be developed) in its 
determination?”).
275 See Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 378.
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competence assessment.”276  He cautioned, however, that before incorporating emotional 
considerations we ought to satisfy ourselves of the existence of a substantial target population 
whose incompetence is not likely to be captured by more traditional cognitive measures, as well 
as of the feasibility of measuring such dysfunction. Perhaps, he argued, the historical focus on 
cognition at emotion’s expense is warranted if it reflects “the experience of courts with regard to 
the major causes of decision-making incapacity.”277  Thus, he asserted, “it is imperative to know 
before beginning that the game is worth the candle.”278 Appelbaum’s concerns, which have not
to date been followed up within the treatment-consent literature,279 are well-placed, though he 
almost certainly was wrong that historical neglect of emotion’s role might reflect the wisdom of 
experience.  Such neglect is entirely consistent with and reflective of the historical disregard of 
emotional considerations that is now under sustained attack.280  And if we look beyond that 
neglectful pedigree, the outlook is hopeful.  
The search for “rational” cognition is , after all, not so very different from the search for 
“rational” emotion; as LeDoux has pointed out, “cognition is not as logical as it was once 
thought and emotions are not so illogical,”281 and as to both we operate with reference not to an 
ideal but to a rough account of the normal.282 Thinking and reasoning are not “inherently 
rational, optimal, desirable, or even smart.  A thorough history of human thinking will include 
quite a few chapters on stupidity.”283  And as abundant research on bounded rationality284 has 
276 Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 378, 382-84 (this is because emotion signals value and assists in formulation of 
goals, and as brain-damage research suggests a strong link between emotion and reasoning (citing BECKY COX 
WHITE, COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 131, 137 (1994), and DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 38)). 
277 Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 385.
278 Id.
279 These questions represent a rich site for potential future research, ideally as a collaborative effort between 
scientists and legal scholars.
280 See Part II.B.2., supra.
281 LEDOUX, supra note 1, at 35.
282 Thanks to Liam Murphy for clarifying this point.
283 Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 93, at 2.
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confirmed, people consistently exhibit normatively non-rational processes when forming 
judgments and making decisions.285  While reliance on cognitive heuristics and biases286 is in 
one sense irrational, it cannot be the sort of irrationality about which adjudicative competence is 
concerned, if for no other reason than that is far too common. 287  Similarly, the fact that most 
people are of only average intelligence and routinely make foolish choices cannot be legally 
significant.  But by buying into the adjudicative competence requirement, we necessarily assume 
that we can somehow, and with some level of consistency, tell the difference between everyday 
irrationality and the competence-threatening sort.288
Even when considering only cognitive function this is often far from an easy call, as 
discussion of the thought-disorder cases reveals. But the quest for such rationality is 
significantly furthered by the decision-making approach  argued here.  Indeed, that approach is 
largely reflected in the forensic assessment instrument created by the MacArthur team.289 More
284 The notion of “bounded rationality,” or the “intelligent use of one’s cognitive resources,” was introduced by 
Herbert Simon.  See Goldstein & Hogarth, supra note 107, at 3, 13.  Like the literature on decision-making 
generally, the literature on bounded rationality is vast, and this Article does not attempt to survey or summarize it.  
See generally BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2002); 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
285 See, e.g., LeBouef & Shafir, supra note 179, at 258-59 (reviewing scholarship on heuristics and biases); Daniel 
Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic Judgment, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND 
REASONING, supra note 93, at 267, 287.
286 See Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 341, 343  (proposing existence of an “affect heuristic”); see also Slovic, 
supra note 122, at 971, 975-76 (same).
287 Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 105, 115 (“Our knowledge of the pervasive irrationality that governs decision 
making—indeed, that governs all human activity —serves as a reason for extreme caution… even generally effective 
decision makers who indisputably have the ability to form accurate beliefs misuse statistics, misunderstand 
probabilities, and accord undue weight to vivid examples.  They may also be profoundly affected by irrational and 
unconscious factors.  Unless we are willing to declare most people incompetent, this simply cannot be enough.”).
288 This distinction roughly parallels that between ordinary cognitive limitation and mental retardation, relevant to 
attributions of criminal responsibility and relative culpability.  See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 n.25 
(2002). 
289 Forensic theorists have made significant strides toward articulating the substrates of adjudicative competence and 
attempting to more consistently and “accurately” measure them.  Though the earliest forensic assessment 
instruments (“FAIs”) were little more than simple checklists, newer ones are more detailed and standardized. See 
GRISSO, supra note 13, at 10-1.  There is a large and rich literature explaining, evaluating, and critiquing the various 
FAIs , an explication of which is beyond the project of this Article.  See GRISSO, supra note 13, at 41-145; Zapf & 
Viljoen, supra note 13, at 353; POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 53-57.  The MacCAT-CA, theoretically based on 
the notion of decisional competence, is poised to become the “gold standard” for assessments of adjudicative 
competence.  But see GRISSO, supra note 13, at  140-41; ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 78 (“The trouble with 
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widespread use of that instrument, the MacCAT-CA, would promote clarity and consistency, at 
least in terms of assessing cognitive disorder.  Encouraging close articulation of the necessary 
steps of decision-making—including by use of the MacCAT-CA—should not, though, be read to 
imply that each step must be ideally executed for the entire process to be deemed minimally 
rational.  
A similar analysis pertains to emotional disorder. Though this Article has explained how 
a dearth or surfeit of particular emotions, a general lack of emotional capacity, or lack of 
emotional balance can threaten competence, that does not signify that a defendant must have 
optimal emotional health to be competent, just as she is not required to display above-average 
intelligence and sharp, non-biased reasoning skills.290 Criminal defendants often will present 
with emotional disturbances, only a small subset of which might threaten competence.291
Defendants may well have had mood disorders and emotional problems before committing the 
conduct of which they are accused; the offense conduct might have been motivated by emotional 
disturbance or itself may have caused trauma; and the prospect of conviction and punishment 
may trigger significant stress and suffering.292 While these factors might matter to adjudicative 
saying one measure of competence is “better” is that “the notion of validity presumes that a ‘hard’ criterion exists to 
be predicted.  Obviously, in the case of judgments of competency, no such criterion does or could exist.”).
290 See, e.g., United States v. Landsman, 366 F. Supp. 1027, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendant with aneurism at the 
base of left frontal lobe was “not a well man, physically or mentally ….  However, many people who are not well 
are legally able to stand trial, and it this Court’s heavy burden to decide whether or not, in this instance, the 
defendant’s physical or emotional problems are so severe as to bar a substantial public interest in the resolution by 
trial of a criminal indictment.”).
291 This Article does not, for example, advocate imposition of a general concept of “emotional competence” that is 
relevant to one’s ability to lead a stable and happy life, such as that explored in CAROLYN SAARNI, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE (1999).
292 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 813 N.E.2d 465, 473-74 (Mass. 2004) (depression in face of likely life 
imprisonment, and remorse and empathy for one’s victims, are “eminently rational”); Reedy v. Wright, 2002 WL 
598434 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2002) (noting that while defendant may have been suicidal, “it is not self-evident that 
contemplation of suicide by a man on trial for murdering his own 2-year-old and 4-year old children demonstrates 
legal incompetency”); Nebraska v. Stooksbury, 2003 Neb. App. LEXIS 322, *13-14 (“Most people facing the 
charges against Stooksbury would likely be less than overjoyed at the very real prospect of prison time; thus, the fact 
that Stooksbury seemed depressed to his counsel is hardly surprising, but it does not rise to the level of establishing 
incompetence.”).
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competence in any given instance, they might not, though a prudent approach would regard 
many such emotional disturbances as warranting further examination.  What we are concerned 
about is the presentation of extreme disorders that can be shown to seriously disrupt one or more 
identifiable stages of minimally stable, self-protective decision-making processes.
In this regard, examination of competence-threatening emotional disorder may not be on 
quite as solid a footing as a cognitive approach .  However, it still falls well within acceptable 
limits.  An example is illustrative.  Consider the MacCAT-CA, which, as “primarily a cognitive 
assessment tool,”293 is not well- suited to an assessment of emotion’s role.  For example, it 
contains only one indirect measure of affect, the “appreciation subscale,” but that subscale is not 
specifically directed to the emotional component of appreciation, but rather to its thought-
disorder iteration.294  Moreover, the understanding and reasoning portions of the MacCAT-CA 
rely on the defendant’s responses to a hypothetical incident, which by reason of being “one step 
removed from the defendant’s actual case”295 may be particularly ill-suited to capturing “Gage 
matrix” dysfunction, in which intact laboratory response to hypotheticals stands in contrast to 
real-life failure.296 These limitations suggest that the MacCAT-CA will be of little use in cases 
of emotional dysfunction.  But such a conclusion would be overstated.  While a new instrument 
could be developed to incorporate the types of emotional considerations urged here, assessment 
of emotional competence need not await such a test.  No forensic assessment instrument is 
293 POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 89.
294 See GRISSO, supra note 13, at 99; POYTHRESS ET AL., THE MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL-
CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION: PROFESSIONAL MANUAL 13-14 (1999) (appreciation measures primarily directed to 
delusional beliefs).
295 Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 360, 362 (characterizing this as the tool’s “main limitation”).
296 See DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 50 (the dissociation could be due to various laboratory 
realities: (1) no real need to make a decision, just to reason about one; (2) no continuing shifts and changes in 
constraints and circumstances; the “ongoing, open-ended, uncertain evolution of real-life situations was missing”).  
This is true more generally of patients with frontal lobe injury and deficits in executive functioning, whose deficits 
are often difficult to detect with standard neuropsychological testing.  See Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 99, at 382
(“the test taking environment is artificial; the examiner provides a great deal of structure to the patient, which may 
mask the patient’s difficulties with such issues as irritation, problem solving, and self-direction”).
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intended to stand alone, but instead is meant to be considered as part of a holistic evaluation 
including clinical observation, review of the defendant’s medical and psychiatric history, 
interviews with those in a position to shed light on her behavior, and evaluation of the particular 
issues and demands at play in the specific case.297 Thus, the MacCAT-CA could be 
supplemented with a more emotion-focused inquiry were the examiner, defense attorney, 
prosecutor, or judge to suspect a relevant emotional disorder.
At least with regard to depression, such an examination is likely to be fruitful.  Clinical 
depression is a relatively well-understood disease affecting a large number of persons.298  While 
its definition and diagnosis always will be subject to meaningful debate, this is equally true of 
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders.  Moreover, as the cases demonstrate, the possible 
incompetence of such persons is not always captured by cognitive tests.  Capturing such
impairments will depend on whether emotional factors are explicitly considered relevant to the 
legal standard.  What is lacking is not a strong empirical foundation for depression diagnoses; it 
is, rather, a strong theoretical foundation within law, such as that offered herein, affirming that 
such depression might matter to competence, and explaining how.  If courts direct examiners to 
make such assessments, those examiners have ready access to the diagnostic tools to comply.
The prognosis for assessment of “Gage matrix” disorder is more mixed. While it now 
appears clear that emotional capacity and reasoning decline together in persons with specific 
forms of frontal damage, causation remains unclear.  Though causation is a highly contested 
297 See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 89 (“no claim is made that” the MacCAT-CA “assesses systematically all 
of the dimensions or issues potentially relevant to adjudicative competence”); POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 306;
GRISSO, supra note 13, at 80; Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 353.  That a defendant’s abilities must be examined 
in light of the specific demands of the particular criminal case is one on which theorists uniformly agree.  See, e.g., 
Winick, supra note 6, at 974 & nn.250-51.  However, this is a common point of failure in actual evaluations.  See, 
e.g., id. at 973 (“Clinical evaluators applying the competency standard rarely inquire into what skills are actually 
needed by a particular defendant in view of the plea or trial strategy his counsel will follow.”).
298 See generally KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 202, at 1284-1440; 
SEVERE DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS, supra note 202.
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issue in the study of psychotic and mood disorders as well, the novelty of the emerging brain 
research warrants particular caution when deciding whether to attribute to it real legal 
significance.299 It is also difficult to know how many people, let alone how many criminal 
defendants, might be affected by such brain damage.  There is reason to believe they may be 
overrepresented in the defendant population.300  It has been suggested, too, that a large 
percentage of death-row inmates suffer from frontal lobe damage,301 and at least some of those 
may well display such disorder.  But detection issues loom large.  The emotional flatness 
characteristic of “Gage matrix” disorder could mimic the flat affect displayed by those 
considered “psychopaths” or even those attempting, for reasons of ego maintenance or self-
protection, to project a tough image.302  Because of the high cost and uncertain payoff of brain 
imaging, in addition to privacy concerns, it would be neither feasible or desirable to image all 
defendants’ (or even all capital defendants’) brains, absent other strong indicators of 
incompetence or brain injury.  
Still, “Gage matrix” disorder should be allowed to inform competence assessment.  In 
cases like Jane’s, where a strange emotional profile—particularly one incorporating highly 
299 See Brent Garland, Future Directions, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 237, at 44-47 (noting 
consensus among lawyers and neuroscientists at conference that “for the well-being of both” law and science “the 
science must be presented, used, and discussed in a realistic and accurate fashion—one that reflects both the 
limitations and the potentials of the science”).  However, law should not be based on antiquated views that conflict 
with modern science; if science has “moved on” but the law has not, the latter should try and catch up.  Deborah 
Denno, A Mind to Blame: New Views on Involuntary Acts, 21 BEHAV. SCI. L. 601, 603-04 (2003).
300 See pp. 61-62, supra.
301 See D. Michael Bitz & Jean Seipp Bitz, Incompetence in the Brain Injured Individual, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
205, 247 (1999); Michael Sarapata et. al., The Role of Head Injury in Cognitive Functioning, Emotional Adjustment 
& Criminal Behavior, 12 BRAIN INJURY 821, 822 (1998).
302 Morse has suggested that “psychopaths” who lack capacity for empathy should be excused from criminal 
responsibility.  See Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, supra note 91, at 264.  (Note, however, that 
“psychopathy” is not properly a mental health term, though some aspects of what is commonly meant by the term  
may be found in the diagnostic classification for “antisocial personality disorder.”  See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, 
at 701-03; KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 202, at 825-26.)  Even 
assuming this to be correct, is it not immediately apparent that a failure of empathy would have an impact on 
competence, as competence is concerned primarily with capacity for self-regard and self-protection; however, the 
impulsivity associated with antisocial personality disorder might be relevant.  Future research may shed light on this 
question.  See generally Christopher J. Patrick, Emotional Processes in Psychopathy, in VIOLENCE AND 
PSYCHOPATHY 57 (2001).
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unusual affective flatness and inability to “read” the emotional signals of others—presents 
together with a history of evidently self-destructive behaviors, there is good reason to suspect 
such disorder.  Because cognition tends to remain intact in such persons, attention to the 
emotional aspect will matter, because without it we are left with a purely outcome-driven 
inquiry: we think the defendant may be incompetent because of the terrible choices she has 
displayed in life.  Such an assessment will fall far short of that required to trigger an inquiry or 
justify an incompetence finding, and cognitive tests likely will reveal nothing unusual. 
Following up on the suspicion created by the addition of apparent emotional disorder, then, 
generally by neurological exam and brain imaging, may bring very important information to the 
table.  The current state of scientific knowledge permits a conclusion that such a profile is 
underlain by a defective decision-making process, although we may not yet know precisely why; 
and the high correlation of emotion and reasoning defects suggests that the latter are both 
substantial and not something over which the defendant has control.  Thus, even under the most 
cautious approach, presentation of such a profile should raise a bona fide doubt as to competence 
sufficient to warrant more searching inquiry.303  Whether any resulting evidence of brain damage 
should be considered to establish Dusky incompetence will be a harder call, highly dependent on 
the exact nature of the damage and the extent to which medical experts and courts are able to 
articulate its effect on the defendant’s ability to make sound, self-protective decisions in the 
context of her case.304  Given the limitations of existing standardized tests such a determination 
almost certainly will require creative solutions, potentially including administration of the type 
303 See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385.  One form of relief requested by Beardslee, which was denied, was a brain scan to 
substantiate his claims of brain injury and resultant emotional deficits.  See note 269, supra.  Under the approach 
advocated here, though applied in the very different context of a clemency determination, that request should have 
been granted.
304 This analysis could apply equally to assessment of other forms of emotional impairment linked to brain injury, 
not just to the specific sort described in this Article.
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of experimental gambling tasks used by Damasio in his research,305 observation of the defendant 
in actual decision-making situations, and interviews of persons who have observed her real-life 
decision-making process es.
Even once we have satisfied ourselves that we can incorporate emotional evaluation into 
competence determinations, we still must ask ourselves if we should.  It is possible that fewer 
defendants will be deemed incompetent under the proposed approach, because the effort might 
lead examiners away from simplistic determinations—for example, those that de facto equate 
psychosis with incompetence—but it seems more likely to result in more—potentially many 
more—incompetence determinations, particularly of the severely depressed.306  Because of the 
doctrine’s delicate balancing act between competing values, undue expansion of the test 
threatens to both impair defendants’ autonomy and frustrate the state’s interest in public safety 
and law enforcement.
Structural features of the competence determination, however, largely guard against any 
serious threat to autonomy and public safety.  In nearly every case, the consequence of an 
incompetence determination is not termination of criminal proceedings: it is a delay in 
proceedings while the defendant is evaluated and treated.307  Extensive delay in proceedings 
surely can weaken a prosecution case, but confinement for restoration of competence may not 
continue indefinitely and must be justified by treatment progress, creating incentives for timely 
resolution.  Depression, even severe depression incorporating elements of thought disorder, often 
305 DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 212-17.
306 This is, of course, an empirical question that warrants exploration.
307 Cf. Goodreau, 813 N.E.2d at 344-45 (record supported finding that defendant’s depression eased sufficiently 
during confinement as to render him competent).  On remand, Milton Dusky was found competent because both 
medical examiners and his attorney found his condition much improved.  See Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 
746 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 998 (1962). Indeed, the vast majority of those referred for evaluation and 
treatment are eventually ruled competent.  See GRISSO, supra note 13, at 79 (10-30% found incompetent); Winick, 
supra note 6, at 925 & nn.9-10, 932-33 & nn.43-44; ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 29, 47-48 & table 3.1 
(incompetence rate averaged 30% across ten studies, from a low of 4% to a high of 77%).  Some of these 
competence findings, though, would come out differently under the proposed test.  
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is amenable to treatment, particularly with medication308—and in very extreme cases medical 
staff may be permitted to administer such medication involuntarily.309  The period of evaluation 
and treatment also is useful for detecting malingering.310  Further, even if the interest in 
enforcing criminal law never is vindicated, the defendant might still be incapacitated, as should 
she be incapable of competence restoration but dangerous to herself or others she will be subject 
to civil commitment proceedings.311  And while the potential for encroachment on autonomy is 
real, most defendants (particularly those with viable defenses) who truly are capable of 
autonomous decision-making have strong incentives to try and prove that they have been 
wrongly identified as incompetent, to avoid both the stigma of involuntary mental health 
treatment and the possibility of long-term confinement with no opportunity for a determination 
of guilt or innocence.312
Further, to the extent that some number of defendants might escape both prosecution and 
confinement, that is an acceptable (if potentially painful) price to pay.313 This is particularly 
relevant to disposition of brain-damaged defendants who, like Jane, likely will never get better.  
Though it is possible that medical experts might identify strategies to improve such defendants’ 
competence, it is prudent to assume that most will be adjudicatively incompetent for life.  The 
same result may obtain with regard to that percentage of the severely depressed whose disease 
308 See, e.g., KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 202, at 1377-1440; Atul 
C. Pande, Pharmacotherapy of Depressive Disorders, in SEVERE DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS, supra note 202, at 243-
67; see generally DEPRESSION: NEUROBIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL, AND THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES 365 et 
seq. (Adriaan Honig & Herman M. van Praag eds., 1997).
309 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-83.
310 See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 365-66 (“it is unusual for even the most artful malingerer to feign incompetence 
successfully for a period of time while under professional care”).
311 See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738; Stephen Hunt, Treatment, not trial for Mitchell, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jul. 27, 2005, at 
A1 (quoting Elizabeth Smart’s father as saying that “a long-term hospital stay for Mitchell would be a satisfactory 
resolution to the case as long as the suspect is kept off the streets”).
312 See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 478, 492-94 (1980).
313 See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738; Cooper, 517 U.S. at 368 n.24.
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defies treatment.314  Should such defendants be neither dangerous nor otherwise subject to civil 
commitment, she may in fact go permanently “unwhipped of justice.”315  But the number of such 
defendants is likely to be relatively small; they will by definition not present an imminent danger 
to public safety; and the ill effects of their disorders may be effectively cabined by surrogate 
decision-making, for example, by appointment of guardians to handle their financial affairs.  
Though not without cost, such a result is far less offensive to the system of criminal justice than 
the trial of an incompetent person in contravention of her fundamental constitutional rights.316
Conclusion
This Article has proposed a thinking-and-feeling conception of the Dusky requirement of 
rational understanding.  To implement this conception, it is vital that courts, examiners, and legal 
scholars join forensic theorists in recognizing the centrality of decisional competence.  Because 
most courts and examiners do not explicitly so frame their inquiry, they deprive themselves of 
transparent access to decision-making theory’s large and useful trove of substantive knowledge 
and analytical tools.  Further, courts, examiners, and legal theorists must join the contemporary 
mind sciences in recognizing that emotion is both deeply intertwined with the mechanisms of 
cognition and of independent significance within rational human decision-making.  Looking for 
and describing the specific cognitive and affective substrates of defendants’ decision-making 
314 Though modern depression treatments can be quite effective, relapse and remission rates are distressingly high.  
See, e.g., DEPRESSION: NEUROBIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL, AND THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES, supra note 308, 
at 34-38.  However, if a defendant can with treatment be rendered competent for the duration of the legal 
proceedings, it is of no legal import—at least not with regard to competence—if she should later relapse.  Moreover, 
relapses are not always at the same level of intensity, and chronic depressives tend not to be those manifesting the 
most extreme forms of the disease.  See KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra
note 202, at 1354.  Therefore, relapse and remission rates are not good predictors of the number of defendants who 
will be so disabled, so permanently, as to pose the dilemma I describe.
315 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 366-68 (quoting United States v. Chisolm, 149 F.284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906)).
316 See id. at 366.
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processes provides a language and methodology that will expose the theoretical and practical 
underpinnings of competence determinations.317
But transparency is not the only virtue.  The advocated approach also will uncover certain 
threats to competence that simply would not be noticed, or regarded as important, under a more 
simplistic or purely cognitive approach.  If, for example, we are unaware that inability to 
perceive and process emotional information is highly correlated with defective reasoning under 
conditions of personal risk, a defendant’s deficits in the former domain— even if proven—lack 
any logical hook into tests of competence.  And if we lack understanding of emotion’s role in 
appraisal, appreciation, and choice, we not only cannot articulate why it is that a profoundly 
depressed person might be incapable of formulating and communicating a sound, stable, self-
protective choice, we cannot voice any theory under which that phenomenon might matter.
Under the approach advocated here, evidence of cognitive function never should be allowed 
simply to trump evidence of emotional dysfunction; nor should the converse be true.  
Adjudicative competence doctrine and practice should strive, rather, to reflect “the harmonious 
integration of reason and passion in the brain.”318
This is not to say that the adjudicative competence conundrum can be solved for once and 
for all by reference to the insights of the mind sciences. 319  Nor, despite significant advances in 
our understanding of human decision-making, may we reasonably expect to discover and define 
317 Such an approach, if implemented consistently, would move the jurisprudence quite far away from the present 
state of affairs, in which most examiner’s reports and judicial rulings simply cite the Dusky standard, recite 
apparently relevant facts, and conclude that the defendant is or is not competent. See, e.g., GRISSO, supra note 13, at 
11; ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 18.
318 LEDOUX, supra note 1, at 21.
319 See Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 237, at 
157; but see Tancredi, supra note 266, at 90-91 (“In the future, it should be possible to determine the impact of 
emotions on any one decision and to develop a method for weighing when the emotions trump an individual’s 
ability to make a personal rational choice.”); Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the law, neuroscience changes 
nothing and everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC. B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004).
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some stable conception of rationality.320  Rationality will, like competence, always retain the 
somewhat elusive quality of an idea.  Shifting the inquiry away from a general search for 
“rationality,” however, and toward a more finely-grained search for rational decision-making 
processes by reference to both cognitive and emotional influences, is one way out of the “black 
hole” into which courts sometimes feel themselves drawn.321 This approach is transparent, 
theoretically defensible, and amenable to concrete implementation.  It offers our best hope for 
giving meaning to “rational understanding.”
320 See Brent Garland, Monitoring and Imaging the Brain, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 237, at 11 
(noting debate as to whether neuroscience can help define rationality).
321 Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 404 n.2 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
